

**The Report of the American
Red Cross Commission
to China**

The American National Red Cross
Washington, D. C.
1929

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**The Letter Transmitting the
Report of the Commission
to the Chairman of the
Central Committee**

The Letter of Transmittal

THE AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS

NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

WASHINGTON, D. C.

September 23, 1929.

HONORABLE JOHN BARTON PAYNE
Chairman, Central Committee
The American National Red Cross
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

The Central Committee at its meeting in April, 1929, adopted a resolution of which a copy follows:

"At its meeting December 12, 1928, the Central Committee considered and approved a letter written by the Chairman under date of November 22, 1928, giving the reasons why it was inexpedient for the Red Cross to undertake to extend relief in China. Chinese relief has been the subject of exhaustive consideration by the Red Cross and the State Department for almost two years. Information from China tends to show that famine conditions exist in certain areas, but there are many other factors to be considered, such as transportation, security for workers and supplies, dangers from banditry and other unsettled conditions, and indeed the fundamental question of whether a condition which has recurred so often can be met through voluntary emergency relief measures, or whether a program of reconstruction and social readjustment extending over many years and involving governmental action is required.

"In order that the Red Cross may be in a position to place the facts before the country and to determine what future action, if any, the Red Cross should take, an exhaustive study should be made of this situation. Such a study can only be made by a visit to China and to the affected areas by competent persons experienced in making such surveys. This will necessarily require time, but it seems the only way the information can be assembled and weighed on the basis of relief experience, and the Chairman is accordingly authorized to arrange to have

representatives of the Red Cross visit China for this purpose to the end that a report adequately dealing with the subject may be submitted to the Central Committee by fall or early winter."

Obedient to this resolution, you appointed a Commission, consisting of myself as Chairman, William M. Baxter, Jr., and Ernest J. Swift. John A. Pope was attached to the Commission as Assistant Secretary.

The Commission sailed from Vancouver May 30th, reaching Peking June 15th. Returning, Messrs. Baxter and Bicknell sailed from Shanghai for San Francisco August 30th. Mr. Swift proceeded to the Philippine Islands to inspect the work of the Philippines Chapter of the American Red Cross and Mr. Pope sailed for home via Europe.

During its stay in China the Commission endeavored to inform itself of conditions in the famine areas, of the causes of those conditions, and of the measures which have been taken to alleviate them. The Commission also gave attention to the larger aspects of the scene in China in so far as these were related to prevailing economic conditions. Opportunity was sought to obtain information and opinions from many intelligent residents of China, both Chinese and foreign. The Chinese Government was most courteous. At its invitation, the Commission visited Nanking where it was hospitably received and entertained by the "President," General Chiang Kai-shek, Mr. C. T. Wang, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and other leaders of the Nationalist administration.

Through the kindness of the Honorable J. V. A. MacMurray, American Minister to China, and with the approval of the Department of State, Mr. Howard Bucknell, Second Chinese Secretary to the Legation, was attached to the Commission during the entire period of its stay in that country. Mr. Bucknell has lived nine years in China, speaks Chinese fluently and has traveled widely in the interior of the country. His services to the Commission were of the utmost value and were given with an industry and a hearty good will which has won the Commission's enduring gratitude.

A month was devoted to a survey of famine areas. Motor

trucks especially constructed to meet conditions of travel in interior China, where good roads are almost unknown, were obtained from the Roy Chapman Andrews scientific expedition to Central China. These trucks were equipped with a complete camping outfit including cook, coolies, a stock of canned foods, etc. A skilled mechanic was included in the crew. Where railroads were available, the trucks were mounted on flat cars. In the further interior, the trucks found their way over country and under conditions of so difficult a character as to appear insurmountable.

In this survey the Commission traveled approximately two thousand five hundred miles. It visited the famine areas of the provinces of Honan, Shensi, Shansi, Suiyuan and Chahar. It thus studied at first hand all the areas which have been regarded as most severely effected, except that of the province of Kansu, which was omitted because of distance and difficulty of access. Conditions in Kansu were reported to be similar to those in the adjoining province of Shensi, save that the depredations by bandits were said to be more extensive in Kansu and the difficulties of sending in relief supplies greater.

Herewith I have the honor to hand you the Commission's Report, which bears the date of August 27, 1929. Accompanying the Report are Appendices, which include several sections devoted to the further consideration of subjects more briefly discussed in the Report. Material in the Appendices is intended to broaden the base of the Report and to meet the wishes of those who desire to acquaint themselves more fully with particular lines of inquiry mentioned therein.

China's problems are so complex and are cast in so vast a mold that the Commission has realized its own limitations in their presence. It has endeavored to avoid all extraneous subjects and to confine its inquiries strictly to matters relating to the causes, relief and prevention of famine in China.

Respectfully

[Signed] ERNEST P. BICKNELL,
Chairman, American Red Cross Commission to China.

**The Report of the American
Red Cross Commission
to China**

The Report of the Commission

Conditions existing in China today do not conform to the popular American conception of the term "famine". The average person is inclined to think of famine as a situation in which there is little or no food to be had and in which rich and poor alike face starvation. Famine of this character does not now exist in China; nor is it probable that this condition has ever obtained on any large scale, yet throughout Chinese history we find the ever present record of "famine".

In many countries, the crop failures now occurring in China would not result in famine, for probably in no other part of the world are so many people living so close to the border of starvation. It is estimated in an official publication of the United States Department of Commerce that 80 per cent of the population, or 340,000,000 people, are engaged in agricultural pursuits. Relatively few, from year to year, produce more than they require for themselves and families, and little is built up in the way of reserves of cash or food supplies. With this lack of economic margin, it is inevitable that large numbers should fall below the existence level when any cause brings about a shortage of food. The poor, falling quickly below this level, starve in large numbers; the middle class survive or starve dependent upon the duration and severity of the food shortage, while the well-to-do seldom suffer except from an economic standpoint.

What Is Famine?

What, then, is famine? In failing clearly to distinguish between the tremendous volume of destitution which is everywhere apparent and a "famine" such as has been the subject of appeals to American sympathy during 1928 and 1929 much confusion has resulted. In the China famine of 1920-21 this confusion led to the adoption by the China International Famine Relief Commission of the following definition of famine:

"Famine is a failure of food supply due primarily to natural causes."

This definition has been widely accepted in China. It may not be sufficiently comprehensive to be fully accurate but it serves the essential purpose of drawing a line between the destitution constantly and everywhere present and the recurring instances of more concentrated areas of distress in which failing harvests are a principal factor.

Investigation by philanthropic bodies in China in 1928 seemed to indicate that while crop deficiency was the immediate precipitating cause of the severe privation in a number of provinces, the distress could not be classified as a "famine" under the accepted definition, because it was evident that the failure of food supply was not primarily due to natural causes. Since there was no reasonable doubt, however, that much suffering existed in the districts in which crops had failed, the agencies which were collecting and distributing American relief discarded the famine definition previously established. At once they found themselves adrift upon the shoreless sea of China's poverty. Estimates of the extent and intensity of the famine, thus unrestricted, leaped to bewildering figures. They ran from a minimum of 10,000,000 persons to a maximum of 65,000,000. Anybody's guess was as good as another's and there is no reason to doubt that the volume of destitution in the affected provinces was as great as was indicated by the highest estimate.

It soon became evident that the American people were reluctant to assume the tremendous burden being urged upon them. In this contingency the American agency engaged in collecting the relief fund, requested a group of Americans resident in China and well known for their public spirit and their knowledge of Chinese affairs, to serve as an Advisory Committee in Peiping [Peking.] This Committee recommended promptly an immediate return to the definition of famine as a failure of food supply due primarily to natural causes. The American organization accepted the recommendation and reduced the basis of its appeal to the number of famine sufferers suggested by the Advisory Committee, namely, 4,000,000.

The Responsible Causes

It will be seen that the point here lies in the attempt to bring America's task within measurable limits rather than to prove that the amount of distress in China had been over-estimated. But the discussion must be carried further if we are to reach basic facts. If natural causes did not account for the "famine" of 1928-29, what were the responsible causes? They may be enumerated briefly:

First: For years China has been in a state of political and economic disorder. Ambitious war lords, recruiting their own armies, have operated in almost every province. As these armies have been lawless organizations without official support or control, they have lived upon the country in which they have moved. The cities have paid high tribute; the country districts have been stripped ruthlessly of grain, of live stock, of carts, of farming implements. Surplus grain saved against time of drought or for seed for the next harvest has been seized. Scores of armies including millions of men have marched and countermarched across the country, or have settled down during periods of inaction to fatten upon the half starved farming population.

Second: The military leaders have seized railways, monopolized their engines and cars, destroyed tracks and bridges in order to hamper opposing forces. They have thus prevented the normal movement of commerce. Grain and other essentials to life could not be sent into the interior provinces which had suffered most seriously from the military depredations. To this day hundreds of engines and thousands of cars belonging to China's several railways are held rusting and rotting in Manchuria by the military head of that region, who fears that if he releases them to the railroads to which they legally belong, they will fall into the hands of his enemies. It is quite possible that this fear is well grounded. Meantime the business of the country is crippled and shipment of grain to the famine areas is but a fraction of the quantity necessary. On August 15, this Commission observed hundreds of tons of grain lying unprotected upon the railway platform at the station of Feng Tai, the junction point from which grain goes for-

ward toward the famine regions of Shansi, Shensi and Suiyuan. Frequent rains were rapidly destroying this grain, while the bags were rotting and bursting. At the same time relief agencies were urgently appealing to the railway authorities for cars with which to convey grain to the famine sufferers.

For a few months no active military operations have been in progress; the armies are chiefly lying quiet awaiting the turn of events. The Nationalist Government is in the ascendant and is laying plans for disbandment, but in August, 1929, little visible progress had been made in that direction. Meantime the manner in which the various war lords are maintaining their armies was indicated in a statement by Mr. Sun Fo, Minister of Railways, in a conference with newspaper representatives at Nanking, August 22, 1929. Mr. Sun in a discussion of the deplorable plight of the Chinese is quoted as saying:

"On account of interference by military authorities it has been most difficult to reorganize the various railways of the country. Four months ago the railways in the north were paying more than \$2,000,000 monthly to various local military groups. The Peiping-Hankow line was paying the Second Group Army Corps every month \$500,000 and the Third Group Army Corps \$350,000, although the total monthly income of the line was only about \$2,000,000. The average monthly income of the Peiping-Suiyuan railway was about \$300,000 and it had to pay \$200,000 a month to the Third Group Army Corps. The southern section of the Peiping-Mukden formerly had to pay the Fourth Group Army Corps and later General Tang Seng-chi's troops \$300,000 monthly. The Lunghai railway pays \$400,000 monthly to the Second Group Army Corps. . . . The average income of the Peiping-Suiyuan railway used to run up to \$800,000, but in recent years it has dwindled to \$300,000. The chief cause is that owing to its heavy subsidies to military authorities, it had to raise its freight rates. The rates are so high that merchants have stopped shipping the goods on the line."

Third: During the recent years of turmoil and military confusion, the soldiers of routed armies, along with deserters and miscellaneous outlaws have turned to banditry in very large numbers. It is doubtful whether the amazing

extent and menace of this form of outlawry in China is comprehended in America. Literally hundreds of thousands of desperate and reckless men are engaged in banditry. Groups of bandits numbering hundreds are not uncommon. They operate with a contempt of local authorities or perhaps at times in collusion with them. Lacking all discipline, responsible to no higher authority, they carry on their atrocities with heartless savagery, sparing no one. Your Commission has in its files copy of a petition sent to the President of China by a famine relief committee of Kansu province, one of the most severely afflicted famine areas. In this petition for relief of famine victims it is stated that of the seventy-eight countries (hsien) of Kansu, seventy have been ravaged by bandits. In addition to seizing all food and clothing and other portable property, bandits frequently kill the people and burn the villages, especially in communities which try to conceal or withhold anything from them.

Fourth: Taxation has been a constant device of oppression. Although carried on in the name of law it is subject to unrestrained abuse. Taxes in theory are levied and collected by the governor or "tuchun" of a province, who is an appointee of the central government. In practice, since the revolution of 1911, with few exceptions, the war lord who has the necessary military power seizes the provincial capital and sets himself up as an independent despot. If he requires money for the support of his personal army, if he wishes to wage war with a rival general, or desires to lay up a fortune against the rainy day which is certain to come in time, he levies new and heavier taxes. It has become a favorite method, during the exigencies of civil wars in the last two or three years, for the provincial despots to send out their collectors to demand payment of a year's taxes in advance. After these have been paid the collectors are sent round to demand payment for a second year in advance, and instances have been reported in which three years' advance taxes have been collected. These collections are enforced with merciless vigor and in lieu of money, grain, animals, implements or clothing will be taken and stories are current of houses being pulled down in

order to obtain the few wooden poles used in their construction, which, in this country of few trees, have a real value.

Fifth: Highways are almost unknown in those sections of China in which famine is found today. The province of Shansi, however, thanks to the leadership of an exceptionally able and far sighted governor, General Yen Hsi-shan, is a notable exception to this statement. He has constructed several hundred miles of substantial dirt roads and as a direct result of this improvement the needs of the famine areas in his province have been met with notable success, notwithstanding the fact that the province contains only one short line of railroad. In many extended areas the only means of communication consists of narrow mountain trails traversed by donkeys, wheelbarrows, native carts, or men carrying packs upon their backs. Where famine areas can be reached only by this means it is obvious that the importation of food in sufficient quantity to feed a large population is quite impracticable.

Sixth: China's population will be double its present total by the end of this century unless the normal increase is checked by famines, epidemics and wars. In past centuries tremendous catastrophies of such character have reduced the population by many millions, but as they did not reduce the rate of increase, their effect was overcome within a few years.

Other nations look to the acquisition of new lands for the accommodation of their surplus people. China's problem is far too great to find adequate relief by that device. If other nations opened wide their doors to Chinese emigrants, and if all the ships engaged in intercontinental passenger traffic on the seven seas were withdrawn from their usual routes and devoted themselves henceforth solely to transporting Chinese from their native land to other countries, it is believed they could not keep pace with the year by year increase of population. In a word, China presents a population problem which defies solution by any available means.

The nation seems to be approaching a period where her land cannot support her people. By economies undreamed

in America, the Chinese people are still able to sustain themselves by the soil, but so delicate has become the balance between food supply and naked starvation that any serious interruption in the regular routine of existence precipitates disaster.

Seventh: Finally we come to natural causes. When in a district which for months or years has suffered from one or more of the causes just enumerated, there occurs a season of partial or total crop failure, starvation conditions quickly follow. The reserve stocks of food, the grain which should have been saved for planting, the draft animals, the necessary farm tools and implements have been taken away. The normal means of bringing in relief supplies have been destroyed or have always been totally inadequate. And so the population of the famine area is pushed below the starvation line and public benevolence is demanded.

Enough Food to Have Prevented Starvation

In these circumstances foreign relief agencies can do little. This Commission has heard no expression of doubt that enough food existed in China to have prevented starvation in 1928 and 1929. In fact it is reported that large quantities of cereals have been exported. The fact is that the operations of the contending rival generals with their independent moving armies, said to have numbered more than 2,000,000 men, swept the normal stocks of food from many provinces and destroyed or paralyzed the only facilities for bringing in food from those areas where food is abundant.

If the restricted definition of "famine" as a "failure of food supply due primarily to natural causes" be discarded and we think of a famine simply as a condition in which many people in a given area lack sufficient food, there can be no doubt that famine has existed in China in 1928-1929. But this "wide open" definition brings its own difficulties. It leaves no clear barrier between the accidental and temporary victims of conditions and the "30,000,000 Chinese who are continually attempting to sustain life on less than the minimum required for subsistence." It lays before the

world an invitation to make good the looting and robbery and confiscations of the war lords and bandits, thus providing them with the opportunity to repeat their exactions, to maintain their outlaw armies, to perpetuate the disorganization which is retarding China's recovery and stabilization.

Notwithstanding the dark threat of suffocation by the weight of its own population, numerous measures have been discussed which should have some effect in lessening the pressure of life upon the patient Chinese people. The great areas of Tibet, Chinese Turkestan and Mongolia, nominally the possessions of China, constitute more than one half the total area of the country. These regions are of limited value for agriculture because of their mountains, lofty plateaus and arid plains. But it is believed they might provide homes and support for a population several times greater than their present estimated 10,000,000 inhabitants. Manchuria contains thousands of square miles of unimproved fertile lands. Already Chinese emigrants from the famine areas of Honan and Shantung are being welcomed in Manchuria and an organized effort to promote this movement is in operation.

Irrigation and reclamation projects, increasing productivity of the land, reforestation, river control, extension of the railway system, now consisting of a total of only 7,000 miles, construction of highways, etc., are among the improvements which are under contemplation and which may some day help to prevent famines "due primarily to natural causes" and bring added opportunity and security to many. A number of provinces are contemplating the construction of irrigation systems and road building projects, and the central government has voted to set apart for railroad extensions several million dollars which will be received from the Belgian Boxer Indemnity funds. One of these projected extensions would carry a railway line to Sianfu, capital of Shensi province, thus skirting a large district which long has been subject to famine. The transportation of food to this district has heretofore been exceedingly difficult, slow and costly. With the completion of the railroad, it should be possible under normal condi-

tions always to prevent serious food shortage by promptly importing large stocks of grain when a period of crop failure is foreseen.

Famine Relief Measures

As to current famine relief measures, the Chinese National Government has not actively participated. It has made no attempt to conduct relief operations, to direct policies or methods, or to coordinate activities conducted by private or public agencies. It has, however, not been indifferent to the needs of the famine areas. In March, 1929, it announced a famine relief bond issue of \$10,000,000 (approximately \$4,500,000 gold). Through a "Famine Relief Commission" the greater part of these bonds were reported to have been distributed to provincial relief committees. The provincial committees in turn were reported in some instances to have sold these bond quotas at heavy discounts and in other instances to have held them unsold. Because of the absence of definite information, it is not possible to state the amount of relief funds obtained from this bond issue. No little cynicism was expressed as to the manner in which it was handled. One circumstantial statement was to the effect that \$3,000,000 of the bonds went to support General Feng Yu-hsiang's army; another was that in one province bonds were sold to the amount of \$500,000 and that with the famine almost ended in that province, the money still remained unexpended in the committee's hands.

In addition to this issue of bonds, the National Government has provided free railroad transportation for relief supplies, eliminated customs duties and promised protection from bandits for relief personnel. It also has given free transportation to emigrants sent from crowded famine districts to the more sparsely populated lands of Manchuria.

It is but fair, in referring to the somewhat meager and comparatively ineffective participation of the Chinese government in famine relief, to call attention to the fact that China has been torn by civil war and is not yet freed from her preoccupations with armies and hostile military leaders, while her new government has still to reach a point of assured stability. Indications are not lacking that in the

future China's interest in the welfare of her people will show a gratifying awakening.

The organizations most frequently encountered and actively engaged in relief work were the China International Famine Relief Commission, Provincial Government committees, foreign missions, the Salvation Army, the Chinese Red Cross, and the Swastika Society. In the province of Honan, is a committee for the transportation of famine sufferers, which has an extensive program of assisting emigrants in moving to Manchuria. Numerous other relief organizations are contributing to this work or are themselves carrying on relief programs. Their work, however, is less widespread than that of the organizations named, and in many instances is limited to a few committees.

The program of the China International Famine Relief Committee, having a centralized control, is the only one which is reasonably uniform throughout the various famine areas. The relief work which it is doing consists in general of labor projects, such as irrigation works, road building and dikes, sale of cheap grain (or P'ing T'iao), and contributions to gruel kitchens managed by other organizations.

The relief programs of the provincial governments, while they vary as between provinces, include the same character of relief as that being rendered by the China International Famine Relief Committee, although P'ing T'iao and gruel kitchens are the principal features of their program. The relief programs of the foreign missions, Salvation Army, and Swastika societies include gruel kitchens, refugee camps, in other words, free relief projects. These gruel kitchens or refugee camps are in some instances partially supported by the China International Famine Relief Commission or the provincial governments.

During its extensive study of famine areas and the relief measures employed in many communities, your Commission found little or no cooperation among the relief organizations operating in the same fields. On the contrary they manifested a surprising ignorance of each other's work. An attitude of indifference, even of suspicion, was occasionally noted. It is obvious that much effectiveness is lost by

these relations of aloofness among the agencies. The increased power and momentum which result from united effort would be reflected in added strength for each unit in the combined action. Failure to take advantage of this well established principle is equivalent to accepting a smaller return for the money and effort expended, when a larger return is available at no greater cost.

Relief Chiefly Matter of Providing Grain

The fact should be strongly stressed that famine relief in China is chiefly a matter of the purchase and transportation of grain. The grain is to be found in Chinese territory and in many instances of famine, grain for relief purposes has been available in neighboring provinces. The grain need not be ground or made into bread, or in any way prepared for consumption. It should be delivered in proper quantities at proper times to the famine sufferers in their own or nearby villages, leaving to them its conversion into food. Every village is supplied with the simple stone rollers by which the grain is crushed for use. This method of relief giving reduces organization and administrative costs to a minimum. It permits the people of the famine region to remain in their homes, to hold their families together, look after their lands and stock and other small belongings. It permits them to supplement their dry food rations with roots and leaves of certain herbs and bushes and even of the shredded bark of elm trees. In a word, it holds family and community life together and prevents the demoralization inevitable when famine is allowed to drive families to distant places for work or food.

The Chinese peasant is perhaps as much the creature of custom and tradition as any class of people in the world. His family, his gods, his land, his habits of work, his ingrained industry and thrift, fix him in a groove from which it is hard for him to break away. To the question then, "Does not the supply of free food to the famine sufferer induce laziness and a desire to hold on to this free support as long as possible?" the answer would seem to be that the life routine passed down for centuries from father to son can scarcely be broken down by a temporary supply of

food without cost. The possible harm is greatly reduced by the fact that the normal home life is uninterrupted and the usual home and community responsibilities and associations are unchanged.

The Fallacy of Public Works as Relief Measure

Much has been said in favor of employment upon the construction of public works as means of relief for famine sufferers. In principle this method is probably sound and doubtless would have the support of students of social work. Nevertheless, the plan involves features which to this Commission seem open to question. Unless famine relief by employment is strongly supplemented by free relief, it cannot prove satisfactory because it reaches only a small proportion of those entitled to help. For example, an irrigation project in the province of Suiyuan was expected to give employment to 15,000 men, whose earnings could scarcely have supported more than 75,000 persons. The number of famine sufferers in that area, however, has been estimated as high as 2,000,000. It is important that the American people who give funds to China under the urgency of poignant appeals to save starving millions should realize that their gifts may be expended upon projects which, however valuable, bring aid to a much smaller number of persons than the same amount of expenditure would help if applied to other forms of relief.

A program of prevention is essentially the responsibility of government, and cannot under any circumstance be developed to a worthwhile extent until such time as a stable and efficient central government is established. In the summer of 1928, Dr. C. T. Wang, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Chinese Government, speaking with Mr. John Earl Baker, who represented China Famine Relief, Inc., said with emphasis that the Chinese Government does not wish foreign organizations to undertake in China relief projects which involve the construction of public works. He said that such works affecting rivers, highways, and the property and rights of Chinese citizens should be the sole concern of the government of China, that the government itself needed no charitable assistance. He added that if

charitably inclined Americans wished to help the Chinese Government they might do so by buying its bonds. On August 20, 1929, this Commission was afforded an excellent opportunity also to discuss this subject with Dr. Wang in Nanking. He holds clearly to the same views expressed to Mr. Baker a year ago.

Famine Inextricable Part of Chaos

China's problems are enormous, complex, and inseparably interwoven with each other. They have been vastly increased by the political chaos which prevailed almost constantly from 1911 to the end of 1928. The famine of 1928-1929 has been an inextricable part of this chaos. Its causes go straight back into chronic conditions of disorder, the crushing exactions of war lords, the unchecked depredations of bandits, the confiscatory taxes by provincial despots, the paralyzed railways, with the consequent restrictions upon commerce.

The American Red Cross Commission embraced the opportunity to meet General Chiang Kai-shek, head of the National Government, Dr. C. T. Wang, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and many other officers occupying responsible places in the national and provincial governments. The impression is inescapable that new China is occupying the seats of power. Everywhere young men are directing affairs, but only time can test their ability to unite China's strong men in the common cause of the country's welfare, to remedy ancient abuses, disband the useless and menacing armies which now prey upon the poverty-stricken people, and inaugurate an era of peace and progress.

By far the greatest need in China today is the development of a consciousness on the part of the Chinese people respecting some of the fundamental causes of famine in their country. The people of China would give more thought to these underlying causes if they were obliged to assume responsibility for the resulting relief needs, and any large measure of relief from outside sources cannot but retard the development of this public opinion, without which no real progress can be expected.

Only Chinese Government Can Solve Problems

The situation then embraces two problems, one of immediate relief for the destitute people in those areas in which food supply is inadequate, and the other a program of preventive measures that will tend to overcome the chronic famine situation confronting the country. Such problems can and should be worked out by the Government and people of China themselves. The immediate relief problem, now rapidly subsiding due to recent rains, is not of such magnitude that it cannot be handled if local existing resources are made available. Only the power wielded by a strong-handed Government can command these resources and the time to work out the vast program of progress required in transportation, reclamation, taxation, education, industry and agriculture; only the Government can exercise the authority and the leadership essential to the unification of the country and the establishment of a reign of law without which the noblest plans for elevating the lives of China's millions must end in failure.

[Signed]

ERNEST P. BICKNELL,

WM. M. BAXTER, JR.,

ERNEST J. SWIFT.

Shanghai, China,
August 27, 1929.

**The Statement Adopted By
The Central Committee**

The Statement

VOTED: That the Central Committee hereby adopts the following statement with respect to the report submitted by the American Red Cross Commission to China:

The Central Committee has received and considered the report submitted by the American Red Cross Commission to China, consisting of Ernest P. Bicknell, Chairman; William M. Baxter, Jr., and Ernest J. Swift, Secretary, appointed pursuant to the resolution adopted by this Committee at its meeting April 22, 1929.

The Central Committee believes that the Commission has discharged its arduous duty with thoroughness and conspicuous ability, and directs that the report be made immediately available to the public, to be printed for distribution to the Chapters, accompanied by the more extensive appendices.

The Central Committee hereby accepts the premises and conclusions developed in the report which may be summarized briefly as follows:

1. That this Committee learns with deep satisfaction that as the result of abundant rainfall, conditions in the principal famine areas are rapidly improving in so far as the restoration of a normal climatic régime can promote that result;
2. That the destitution which prevails in the famine areas is the cumulative result of the chronic conditions of disorder, the crushing exactions of the war lords, the depredations of bandits, the enforced payment of confiscatory taxation, and the crippling and consequent inability of the railroads to function beyond a fraction of their normal capacity—to these was added a severe drought which brought the whole to a tragic climax;
3. That these conditions do not present a situation which can adequately be dealt with by a foreign emergency relief agency; hence do not warrant an appeal

by the Red Cross to the generosity of the American people;

4. That Chinese leaders would no doubt give more thought to the removal of the causes which impoverish their people and bring on such tragedies if they realized the necessity of assuming full responsibility for resulting relief needs; any acceptance of that responsibility by foreign agencies cannot but retard this all important result;

5. That the American Red Cross is convinced only a wise, strong, stable, central government can command the power and resources and continuity of policy necessary to lead China out of her condition of disorder into a new era of peace, security and prosperity; and is further convinced that disastrous conditions leading to continued suffering will constantly recur until such a government comes into being.

Sympathizing deeply as we do with the efforts of patriotic Chinese to bring about these happy conditions, we nevertheless believe that China should be permitted to work out her own salvation, and that to extend relief to her in the absence of conditions plainly due to an act of God—natural causes—but retards her ultimate recovery.

The Appendices

The Appendices

APPENDIX I

Report of the Survey of Famine Areas

For the purpose of studying famine conditions in several of the interior provinces of China, two members of the American Red Cross Commission visited the provinces of Honan, Shensi, Shansi, and Suiyuan, during the period July 3-30, inclusive. The party consisted of William M. Baxter, Jr., Ernest J. Swift, of the Commission, John A. Pope, and Howard Bucknell of the American Legation. Available information regarding the areas in which famine conditions were reported made it quite clear that if the Commission was to make a report within any reasonable time, it could not, with the limited transportation facilities available, undertake an inspection of all areas. Therefore, advice was sought of the China International Famine Relief Commission, the American Advisory Committee, government officials, and other available sources as to areas where conditions were reported as most serious and more or less typical. On the basis of this information, a trip was planned which had as its principal objective an inspection of the famine areas of Shensi, Shansi, and Suiyuan, but which also included Hopei (formerly Chihli), northern and western Honan, and a small part of Chahar. The report of the survey has been prepared under the following headings:

- a. General observations and conclusions regarding famine conditions.
- b. Narrative chronological report of trip.

In making the study above referred to, it was the purpose to ascertain:

- a. The existence and extent of famine conditions.
- b. The relief measures now being applied to the situation.

- c. The need, possible source, and effectiveness of any measures for additional relief.

Does Famine Exist?

Conditions existing in China today do not conform to the popular American conception of the term "famine". The average person is inclined to think of famine as a situation in which there is little or no food to be had, and in which rich and poor alike die of starvation. Famine of this character does not now exist in China; nor is it probable that this condition has ever obtained on any large scale, yet throughout Chinese history we find the ever present record of "famine". That famine conditions, as the term is commonly understood in China, exist in many parts of the country must be apparent to even the most casual observer. In his book, *China: Land of Famine*, W. H. Mallory points out that "between the years 108 B. C.—1911 A. D., there were 1,828 famines, or one nearly every year in some of the provinces. . . . In fact the normal death rate may be said to contain a constant famine factor."

In many countries, the crop failures now occurring in China would not result in famine, for probably in no other part of the world are so many people living so close to the border of starvation. It is estimated in an official publication of the Department of Commerce that 80 per cent of the population or 340,000,000 people are engaged in agricultural pursuits. Relatively few, from year to year, produce more than they require for themselves and families, and little is built up in the way of reserves of cash or food supplies. With this lack of economic margin, it is inevitable that large numbers should fall below the existence margin, when drought or any other catastrophe brings about a shortage of food. In other words, when a food shortage occurs in China, millions of people are affected. The poor, falling quickly below the existence margin, starve in large numbers; the middle class survive or starve dependent upon the duration and severity of the food shortage, while the well-to-do seldom suffer except from an economic standpoint.

Due to a variety of factors, in which natural causes by

no means predominate, food shortages do exist in several parts of China today. The poor people in these areas are in destitute circumstances, and being unable to buy grain or other food supplies at the high prices prevailing, are suffering, and in some instances dying of starvation or disease resulting from malnutrition.

What Is the Extent of Famine?

In a bulletin entitled *Salient Facts about China*, Julean Arnold, Commercial Attache of the American Legation in Peking, makes the following statement:

"All Chinese statistical data except the customs returns of trade are estimates only and in some cases the best that can be said of them is that they are educated guesses."

The truth of this statement is appreciated when one endeavors to determine through local inquiry the actual number of persons needing relief in the various areas.

In February of this year, the American Advisory Committee estimated that 4,000,000 people were facing starvation in accessible areas. About August 1, this estimate was cut in half because the rains which in many sections started falling about July 10, have been sufficient to assure at least partial crops this fall. The total population of the districts needing urgent relief is now estimated by the China International Famine Relief Committee at 20,000,000. The estimate of the American Advisory Committee would suggest 10 per cent of this total as requiring relief. The estimate of those requiring relief as presented to the Commission by local groups and individuals was usually 60 per cent and sometimes as high as 80 per cent.

Our observation of conditions would by no means support these latter estimates. For instance, in the province of Suiyuan only 3,000 men were at work on the new irrigation project undertaken by the China International Famine Relief Committee as a famine relief project. Although employment was available for 15,000, the largest number at work at any time was 10,000, and this number had dwindled to 3,000 with the advent of the rains. If the

estimate of the Suiyuan relief organizations that 2,000,000 people were destitute was correct, it would seem that at least 15,000 people would have taken advantage of this employment opportunity.

The most distressing conditions encountered by the Commission existed in Wei Peh district of central Shensi, which lies to the north of the Wei river, and extends from the eastern to the western border of the province. There thousands of people, estimated to be 10 per cent of the population, are in need of assistance now, and will probably continue to need help until the wheat crop of next winter matures. In the Hotung area of southern Shansi, around Yuncheng, the conditions have been bad, but in this district the provincial government is supplying cheap grain in quantities sufficient to relieve the situation. The crisis in the province of Suiyuan was undoubtedly reached in March or April of this year, since which time conditions have gradually improved and a fair fall crop is assured now that good rains have fallen. Furthermore, the assurance of this crop has brought to the market large quantities of hoarded grain, which are now available at low prices.

With the exception of the Wei Peh district of Shensi and the Hotung area of Shansi, famine conditions were not apparent in the parts of the provinces of Shensi, Shansi, and Suiyuan visited by the Commission. Other sections were in fair condition, while the irrigated districts, which are small but numerous, will harvest good crops.

Some Causes of the Present Famine Situation

When inquiries were made as to the causes of local conditions, "civil war, military oppression, banditry, and drought", was the usual answer. Numerous factors enter into every famine situation. The fundamental cause may be natural, political, economic, or even social. Often there is a great difference between the immediate and fundamental cause. The immediate cause in several instances was undoubtedly drought, although conditions existing in areas visited cannot be ascribed primarily to this or other natural causes.

That the lack of stable and effective government has been a large factor in creating the present situation might be shown by many illustrations of which the following are typical:

- a. The comparison of conditions in the provinces of Shensi and Shansi;
- b. The comparison of conditions in certain fortified villages in Suiyuan, under the control of Belgian Catholic missionaries, with neighboring villages that have not been afforded protection and direction.

The province of Shansi has suffered little from civil war. Governor Yen Hsi-shan has administered its affairs since the revolution. He has been evidently sincere in his desire to help his people, and now under his direction the famine situation in Shansi is being cared for with little outside assistance. The drought situation and agricultural conditions in southern Shansi are quite as distressing as those directly to the west and across the Yellow river in Shensi. In Shansi, the people are still in their homes, the villages are intact, banditry does not appear to exist, soldiers are not everywhere in evidence, while in Shensi villages are frequently deserted, banditry is prevalent, and many communities are required to feed large bodies of troops. In Shansi there was a feeling of stability and security, while in Shensi it was necessary to travel always with a military escort and even then there were districts into which the commander of our escort considered it unwise to go because he feared an encounter with larger bodies of bandits than could be resisted.

In Suiyuan, we visited villages under the direction of Catholic missionaries, in which the people were living in comparative comfort and safety. These missionaries had so successfully organized their defense against bandits and so directed the village agricultural operations that the villagers were independent of outside assistance. In contrast, their neighbors in other villages, located within a short radius, and farming the same kind of land, were suffering to a very serious extent. In fact, such unprotected villages were largely deserted. The people had reached a stage of such destitution that they had torn down their

houses to sell the timbers, and had finally abandoned their homes in the hope of finding a livelihood elsewhere.

The above illustrations also serve to emphasize the complete lack of any centralized government. One has the feeling as one passes from province to province of passing from one country to another. The officials at Chengchow could not give any assurance that it would be safe to travel to Loyang, only 72 miles distant, and located in the same province. There was no direct working relationship as between the military and civil authorities at Tungkwan in Shensi and those just across the Yellow river in Shansi. As the Commission passed from one province to another, and even from town to town, it was necessary to satisfy local officials with regard to the objects of its visit.

In some sections the development of any centralized direction and control would appear to be almost impossible because of the disorganized condition of the various means of communication. Railroad transportation is completely disorganized, railway lines are going to ruin, revenues are being appropriated for local military purposes, neither rolling stock nor road beds are being maintained, and service is uncertain. Ensuring the safe arrival of less than carload shipments is practically impossible except where convoyed by representatives of the shipper. Letters from Sianfu to Peiping, 750 miles away, require two or three weeks for delivery. Telegrams take nearly as long. We witnessed the delivery at Sianfu on July 10 of a telegram dated at Peiping June 15, and have in our own files a telegram sent on August 1 from Sianfu and delivered on August 7 in Peiping.

Relief Work Now Being Done

The organizations most frequently encountered and actively engaged in relief work were the China International Famine Relief Commission, Provincial Government committees, foreign missions, the Salvation Army, and the Swastika Society. In the province of Honan, there was a committee for the transportation of famine sufferers, which has an extensive program of assisting emigrants in moving to Manchuria. Numerous other relief organizations are contributing to the work done by the above, or are themselves carrying on relief programs. Their work,

however, is less widespread than that of the organizations named, and in many instances is limited to a few committees.

The program of the China International Famine Relief Committee, having a centralized control, is the only one which is reasonably uniform throughout the various famine areas. The relief work which they are doing consists in general of labor projects, such as irrigation works, road building and dikes, sale of cheap grain (or P'ing T'iao), and contributions to gruel kitchens managed by other organizations.

The relief programs of the Provincial Governments, while they vary as between provinces, include the same character of relief as that being rendered by the China International Famine Relief Committee, although P'ing T'iao and gruel kitchens are the principal features of their programs. In the field of governmental relief, the accomplishment of the province of Shansi is outstanding. Shansi, although confronted with a serious situation in southern part of the province, has succeeded in financing a relief program which is now meeting the situation so adequately that no outside relief is necessary. A recent newspaper report on the efforts of the China International Famine Relief Committee respecting famine conditions in the various provinces, comments as follows, regarding the situation in Shansi:

"The Shansi Government has brought in and distributed substantial quantities of grain in the areas which were affected by famine so that further outside relief is not needed in this province."

Press reports of August 7 state that a \$3,000,000 provincial loan has been authorized to continue the famine relief program in which the Shansi provincial government is now engaged.

The relief programs of the foreign missions, Salvation Army, and Swastika societies include gruel kitchens and refugee camps—in other words, free relief projects. These gruel kitchens or refugee camps are in some instances partially supported by the China International Famine Relief Commission or the provincial governments.

Need for Additional Help

In certain sections serious food shortages exist. Many people are in need of help, and will undoubtedly continue to need help for several months. As present conditions improve, other situations may develop, as has been the case in the past. The famine map of China changes almost from week to week. During the sixty days that the Commission has been in China, many changes have taken place.

The situation in the sections of China visited embraces two problems, one of immediate relief for the destitute people in those areas in which food shortages exist, and the other a program of preventive measures that will tend to overcome the chronic famine situation confronting the country. Such problems can and should be worked out by the Government and the people of China themselves. The immediate relief problem is not of such magnitude that it could not be handled if local existing resources were made available. Certainly they are not situations for which, under existing conditions, the American people as individuals should be asked to assume responsibility.

A Narrative Report of Journey to Various Provinces

The country covered by the field party of the Commission is seldom traveled by foreigners. Reports in Peiping warned us of the uncertainty of transportation and the inadequacy of accommodations along the way; and in view of this, we equipped ourselves with such transportation, food, and shelter as would render us entirely independent throughout the journey. To this end we secured from the Central Asiatic Expedition two three-quarter ton Dodge motor trucks, employed a cook, a mechanic and a boy, and loaded the trucks with the necessary food, tentage, and fuel supply for the trip that we had planned. This outfit was with us at all times, the trucks accompanying us on flat cars whenever we traveled by train. While on the Lung-Hai railroad, we rode on the flat cars with the trucks, as no more inviting accommodations were available.

Leaving Peiping at 9:40 a. m. on the morning of July 3, we went by rail to Chengchow on the Peiping-Hankow

railroad 416 miles south of Peiping and the junction point of the Peiping-Hankow and the Lung-Hai railroads. Service on the Peiping-Hankow had only recently been resumed, the Yellow river bridge having been destroyed in connection with certain military operations and service was therefore slow. We arrived at Chengchow at 7 p. m. on the evening of July 4, and spent the night at a Chinese hotel. In the morning, after much persuasion, the agent of the Lung-Hai railroad agreed to attach the Peiping-Hankow flat car to the train on his line in spite of the fact that there is almost no exchange of equipment between the various lines at the present time. This, however, was finally accomplished, and we started west from Chengchow at noon on July 5, much against the advice of the missionaries and Chinese relief workers who had reports that bandits were very numerous in western Honan.

The train, while operating as a passenger train, was occupied largely by troops of the 14th Division of the Nationalist Army moving westward to take over territory that was being evacuated by the army of General Feng Yu-hsiang. At 7 p. m. on July 5, we reached Siao Yi on the Lo river. The bridge across this river had been destroyed by General Feng's troops as they retreated so we unloaded our trucks with the idea of proceeding to Sianfu by auto. On the night of July 5, we camped on the east bank of the river, along with the troops of the Nationalist Army. Getting across in the morning proved a difficult task as it was impossible to ford, and the water was so shallow that barges had difficulty in getting near the east bank. The troops were crossing on a bridge made up of barges, but while the first few of these were large enough to support our cars, those in the middle were too small. Finally we drove out onto the bridge as though we were going to cross; and landing our trucks on two of the largest barges, persuaded the officer in command of the troops as well as the boatmen that the only way to get us off was to tow these barges to the west bank where we could get close enough to the shore to build a runway of plank. It was finally agreed that, after all the troops then waiting had

gone over, this plan would be tried; and after the passage of about 4,000 men, the bridge was cut and our cars landed safely on the west bank of the Lo.

The road through this section is only a cart road, exceedingly rough and narrow, so that progress was slow. After about 10 miles we passed beyond the head of the column of advancing troops, and with an apparently clear road, we were optimistic enough to set our goal for the day as Shanchow about 115 miles to the west; but we were soon to be disillusioned. About five miles beyond the head of the advancing troops, we drove up to a village with its gates closed, and found ourselves covered by rifles from the top of the village wall. The possibility of bandits and similar thoughts ran through our minds as we sat with our hands raised waiting for the next move. The men on the wall motioned for us to get out of our cars and come over to the gates. We indicated that we would stay put and that they might come out. This they did, and we learned that they were General Feng's troops stationed at this village of Iching Pu as an outpost as well as to protect the villagers from bandits who had their base in the adjoining village of Pai Ma Sse. A Captain Yo was in charge of the garrison, and he persuaded us that it would be unsafe to go on as we could not avoid the village of Pai Ma Sse which was controlled by bandits. For the next four hours, until about 3 p. m., we remained at Iching Pu while Captain Yo communicated both with his commanding officer, General Hsueh Chia Pui at Loyang, and with the bandit chief at Pai Ma Sse which was a mile and a half to the west. Finally our safe passage was agreed to, and at about 3 p. m. we started on accompanied by Captain Yo and several of his men.

The twelve miles to Loyang were negotiated in about two hours, and at five we reported to military headquarters at Loyang, or Honanfu as it is sometimes called. Here we were received by General Hsueh Chia Pui. His attitude was quite courteous, but it was clear that he was anxious that we should be on our way. He indicated that travel by road to Shanchow would be inadvisable, that the road was bad, and that bandits were numerous; within the last few days he had been obliged to send troops to secure the

release of a Frenchman taken by bandits near Kwanyintang. He had, however, a military train leaving within an hour; and if we would go immediately to the station he would provide cars for our trucks and assistance in loading them. It was soon clear to us that the evacuation of Loyang was in progress; and on the night of July 6, and in the 24-hour period following, General Hsueh withdrew from Loyang taking with him to Shanchow all of the railroad equipment he could haul, and finally blowing up bridges to the west to impede the progress of the Nationalist troops. So that on July 6 we advanced with one army, retreated with a second, and between daylight and dark covered about 37 miles by car. Midnight of the 6th still found us at Loyang trying to load two trucks on flat cars with just a few small planks as runways. After appropriating the door of a nearby box car, we finally made the grade and by 3 a. m. had the trucks on board. It was six in the morning before our train was through switching and ready to pull out. As it left, it was made up of two live engines, one pulling and one pushing, three dead engines, the two flat cars on which our trucks were loaded, and an endless number of box cars loaded with troops and military supplies. Just 17 hours later, and about 24 hours after we started to load at Loyang, we pulled into Shanchow, a distance of 100 miles. The temperature on the 5th, 6th, and 7th had ranged around 100°-106°.

Upon our arrival at Chanchow at 11 p. m. on July 7, we unloaded the trucks and drove down to the Yellow river, making camp about midnight.

On July 8, we started at 7 a. m., and about 3:30 p. m. stopped at a point five miles west of Tungkwan in the province of Shensi, a distance of about 65 miles. This was our first drive on a motor road, and while much of it was soft, being built through loess and not surfaced, it was a big improvement over the cart roads we had travelled thus far. On July 9, we rested in camp, and on the 10th drove to Sianfu in four hours, a distance of 80 miles. These figures in themselves indicate the quality of road (between Tungkwan and Sianfu). The afternoon of the 10th and all day of the 11th were spent in Sianfu. On the morning of

July 12 we drove west to Fengsiang near the Kansu border. The road was in fair condition, but many of the grades were so steep that the cars had great difficulty in negotiating them even in low gear. We covered the 99 miles in about eight hours, and the next day returned to Sianfu.

On the 14th, we started north from Sianfu, and drove to Sanyuan. The roads through this section are terrible, and it was necessary to ferry both the Wei and King rivers. These ferries, which are nothing more than flat decked barges, are not often called upon to handle automobiles, and their equipment for getting cars on and off is pretty scanty. The crossing of rivers in this territory was always a real undertaking, and filled with risks to our cars. On July 15, we covered 115 miles in the territory north of the Wei river, and east of Sanyuan. While there is a motor road in this section, it was so soft that the cars had difficulty in maintaining headway, even in low, so that we travelled cart-roads throughout the day. The Lo river was ferried twice, the Wei once, and the Yellow river once. In crossing the river bottom of the Wei, we encountered a sandstorm of such intensity that it became necessary to stop several times in order to make sure we were still on the road. On the evening of this day, we camped at a small village in Shansi on the bank of the Yellow river opposite to Tungkwan. The distance from there to Taiyuanfu was covered in a day and a half on the 16th and 17th, our mileage on the 16th being 200 and on the 17th 130 miles. This section of road was by far the best we had encountered.

On the 18th, we remained in Taiyuanfu, starting early on the morning of the 19th for Tatungfu about 200 miles to the north on the line of the Peiping-Suiyuan railroad. Here we expected to ship our cars by rail to Saratsi which was to be our headquarters for the inspection of the Suiyuan district. The road from Taiyuanfu to Tatungfu is generally good and comparable to the road from Taiyuanfu to the Yellow river; the distance of 200 miles should be easily covered in one day. Exceedingly heavy rains, however, occurring just ahead of us had caused heavy damage to the road through the mountain section and in

the plains country north of the mountains, so that while we covered 111 miles without great difficulty the first day, we were three days going the remaining 89 miles. One cannot adequately describe the condition of this 89 miles of road, and only the fact that there were an unlimited number of coolies always on hand when we found ourselves in difficulty made it possible for us to get through.

We were obliged to build ourselves a road around at least thirty breaks, and at one point spent over three hours driving two miles up the bed of a river over endless boulders. Arriving at Tatungfu late on the afternoon of July 22, we were able to secure a flat car promptly and get our trucks loaded before dark. We spent the night in the railroad yard on a car supplied to us by the military commander of that city, and in the morning moved to a car furnished by the Governor of Suiyuan which had come into the yards during the night.

Our two cars were attached to the train for Saratsi leaving at 7:30 a. m. on the morning of the 23rd. At Suiyuanfu, the capital of the province, which point we reached about 11 p. m., we were visited by a committee representing the Governor and the China International Famine Relief Committee, and prevailed upon to stop over for a day for conference with them. The 24th was spent at Suiyuan, and at 7 our cars were run over to Saratsi on a special train arriving about 11 p. m.

The period of July 25-27 inclusive was spent in and around Saratsi. On the 25th, we drove to Paotow, the terminus of the railroad; and on the 26th, east and south towards Tokoto. The 27th was spent in Saratsi.

After selling our trucks we started back to Peiping on the morning of the 28th, still making use of the car provided for us by the Governor of Suiyuan. Our arrival at Peiping on the morning of July 30 concluded a trip of approximately 2,500 miles of which about 1,300 was covered by rail, and 1,200 by auto.

APPENDIX II

The Famine Conditions

Measuring the Famine of 1928-29

During famine relief operations of 1920-21 in China, the China International Famine Relief Commission officially adopted the following definition of famine:

"Famine is a failure of food supply due primarily to natural causes."

This definition was generally accepted and has stood unchallenged since its adoption. In 1928, China Famine Relief, Inc., of New York, the body which has undertaken to collect a relief fund for China, set aside this definition as its guide. It was moved to this decision by the knowledge of conditions of need caused by the combined action of agencies of so complex and varied a character that "failure of food supply due primarily to natural causes" failed completely to account for the great volume of distress which spread into many provinces. By thus departing from the accepted definition of famine, the field of relief was enormously widened, and this expansion was considered a sufficient justification for an appeal for the unusual amount of \$12,000,000.

China Famine Relief, Inc., conducted an active campaign upon this expanded basis from the spring of 1928 until February 1929. To support this drive, staggering statistics were quoted. Estimates of the number of persons "facing famine" or "starving" varied so widely as to perplex the American people. China Famine Relief, Inc., took its stand upon estimates compiled by the China International Famine Relief Commission of Peiping, which it had selected to act as its distributing agent. This Commission fixed the number facing famine in the summer of 1928 at 12,000,000 persons, adding that before the spring of 1929 the number would increase to 20,000,000. These were said to be scattered through the nine provinces of Hupeh, Honan, Shantung, Hopei (Chihli), Shansi, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shensi,

and Kansu. At about the same time that these estimates were published in the United States, Marshal Feng Yushiang (the "Christian General"), then Minister of War in the Chinese government, telegraphed the American Red Cross that in three of these nine provinces, namely, Honan, Shensi, and Kansu, 27,000,000 persons were starving. Other estimates relating to this province or that, all very large and bearing little relation to each other, were sent to the United States and given publicity.

This puzzling and incoherent condition of things continued until China Famine Relief, Inc., decided to create an American Advisory Committee in China to which the American funds would be forwarded and which would hand over to the China International Famine Relief Commission sums necessary to carry out specific relief undertakings recommended by the Commission and approved by the Advisory Committee. Members appointed to the Advisory Committee were:

Charles R. Bennett, Manager of the Peiping Branch of the National City Bank of New York, Chairman; Paul Jernigan, Manager for the Standard Oil Company of New York, Peiping, Treasurer; Roger S. Greene, of the Rockefeller Foundation in the Far East; H. H. Hartigan, Manager of the British American Tobacco Company, in Peiping; Dom C. Stehle, of the American Catholic University in Peiping; Rev. John D. Hayes of the Presbyterian Mission, Peiping; Rev. R. M. Cross of the American Board Mission; W. B. Christian of the British American Tobacco Company, Tientsin; Rev. Carl Felt of the Methodist Mission, Peiping.

In getting its bearings and establishing its relationships to its responsibilities, numerous communications were forwarded to China Famine Relief, Inc. After a meeting of the Committee on February 14, 1929, a cable was sent New York, in part as follows:

"Area and intensity famine in each province greatly augmented during past year by political and military measures, while last three (Suiyuan, Shensi, and Kansu) are frontier land and difficult of access. At present banditry and unruly soldiery handicap relief work while

communications are still mainly in hands of military.

"In view political conditions, active cooperation Chinese Government indispensable. It is opinion your Committee therefore that this assistance might well take form of designating areas to be relieved, of remitting present taxes on food stuffs coming into areas and assuming some financial responsibility either locally or nationally for this vital and stupendous task."

Later in a report to New York the Advisory Committee said:

"It was felt too that the campaign in America would have a better chance of success if the Government shouldered the task and gave concrete evidence of its determination to meet the situation."

The following paragraph is taken from the report last quoted:

"February 21st the China International Famine Relief Commission presented a preliminary survey of the designated areas (designated by the Government as famine areas in need of help) and estimated the population affected as per Secretary's report. This estimate placed the population of the districts needing urgent relief at 21,000,000 for all areas regardless of causes. Naturally not all of that number were destitute, and as some of these areas were inaccessible and as the National Government had announced the issue of \$10,000,000 Custom bonds for famine relief, the Committee, especially in view of many conflicting reports re bandit and military requisitions, etc., decided to abide for the time being by the 1921 definition of famine, namely 'famine is failure of food supply due primarily to natural causes.' It was felt that districts mainly outside this classification could be more effectively handled by the central Government especially as the problem in such districts is not only immediate relief, but rehabilitation both politically and economically."

Having reached the decision outlined in the preceding paragraph, the Advisory Committee, New York, stated the decision to adhere to the famine definition of 1921 and upon that basis cabled the New York Committee that 4,000,000 persons facing starvation were relievable. Upon receipt of this communication, China Famine Relief, Inc., in New York at once modified its appeal from \$12,000,000 and

20,000,000 famine victims to \$4,000,000 and 4,000,000 famine victims. About August first this latter estimate was cut in half because of rains which had begun falling in many sections.

Reasons for Wide Variation in Estimates of Famine Sufferers

Everyone who has given the subject thought has been impressed by the amazing variations in famine estimates. At first glance it would seem that gross exaggeration or unrestrained guesswork must account for the fantastic figures soberly laid before the public. Perhaps a brief explanation may be helpful.

It may be said at once that such estimates are more or less affected by the natural bent of mind of the persons who make the estimates. The conclusion of the cautious, conservative observer will differ from that of the impulsive individual who is inclined to "see big." But these differences do not account for the striking discrepancies to which reference has been made.

A famine area is not a clearly defined tract of country inside of which all the people are faced with starvation while people immediately outside the tract have sufficient food. It is, in fact, impossible to exactly fix the boundaries of a famine area in China. Within such an area some people have plenty. Some will starve if not helped. Between these extremes every imaginable gradation of condition will be found.

The impossibility of accurately determining the number of famine sufferers is obvious. If the observer is highly emotional or "sees big" he will include in his estimate of starving, degrees of privation which the conservative observer will omit. Two observers, both of whom have visited a famine area, differ so widely in their estimates that the figures of one may be double those of the other. More often, however, estimates are based on reports from all kinds of sources, some of which are influenced by the hope of obtaining the largest possible allotment of relief funds; while others are based on observation of a few villages severely affected by famine, from which sweeping generalizations are made. Infinitely complicating these

calculations is the fact that a census is unknown in China and population figures quoted range from intelligent estimates to sheer conjecture.

The method of estimating the number of famine victims adopted by the China International Famine Relief Commission is to take the best available estimate of the population of the entire hsien (county) in which famine is reported to exist, and to use this figure instead of trying to discover what proportion of the total of the population in each hsien is starving, what proportion is threatened by starvation, and what proportion presumably beyond danger. In February, 1929, it prepared a comprehensive table of estimates for the American Advisory Committee. This table classified the famine areas as follows:

Class "A" (High death rate in March, 1929) 129
Hsien; population, 21,016,000.

Class "B" (High death rate expected before harvest)
86 Hsien; population, 19,137,000.

Class "C" (Only indigent class expected to perish) 84
Hsien; population, 17,197,000.

It is obvious that these estimates give no basis for definite conclusion as to the number of persons actually requiring help to save them from starvation. The impression received is that many people are in need, as indicated by the death rate, which is not supported by any accurate statistics. This impression is supported by observations of missionaries, and by reports of travelling investigators and native officials. In the provinces of Honan, Shensi, and Kansu, the China International Famine Relief Commission gave the total population of the hsiens in Class "A" (worst famine sections) as 16,775,000 while the former Chinese Minister of War made the flat assertion that 27,000,000 persons were starving in those three provinces. As further illustrating the uncertain character of all these estimates, the fact is noted that the China International Famine Relief Commission estimates the population of the three classes of famine affected hsiens in Shensi at 11,028,000 while the accepted estimate of the total population of the entire province, 1923, is 9,465,000.

Another method of establishing the number of famine

sufferers is to fix an arbitrary percentage of the total population as victims of famine. An observer may visit a number of villages and make inquiries as to the number of famine stricken. Upon these inquiries, he will conclude that a certain proportion of the population is in that class, say one half of all. Generalizing from this basis he will make an estimate that one half the people in the entire province are facing starvation. It is simple enough to convert such an estimate into figures. If the same observer had chanced to visit a group of villages in which the conditions were less severe, his estimate of the number of famine victims in the province would naturally have been smaller.

Causes of Famine of 1928-29

At the beginning of this Appendix mention is made of the decision of China Famine Relief, Inc., of New York to discard as its guide the well recognized definition of famine as "a failure of food supply due primarily to natural causes". Immediately following that mention are excerpts from the reports and telegrams sent by the American Advisory Committee in Peiping to New York, explaining why the Committee holds it necessary to return to that definition as a guide. The reasons which led to these alterations of policy go back to causes which are of dominating importance if we are to understand existing conditions.

We come at once to the facts which led these organizations to take directly opposite decisions:

A. China Famine Relief, Inc., of New York, found that the suffering among the farmers of many areas was due to a combination of causes which lay chiefly outside the accepted definition of famine. If it were to meet the situation adequately and to maintain a relief operation consistent with its appeal for a fund of \$12,000,000 it would have to release itself from the restrictions of that definition.

B. The American Advisory Committee in Peiping, on the contrary, realized that without the protection of the famine definition, the relief effort would be launched on a shoreless sea. The extent of destitution had no definable bounds. It was the result of a multitude of causes which no relief organization could remove, overcome or neutralize. That old simile of futility, "as well try to bail out the ocean with a sieve," would be applicable in this case.

Natural causes played their part. The pressure of over-population, incessant, irresistible like the slow, crushing advance of a glacier, is always a factor. Failure of the normal rainfall, the effect of which is ordinarily neutralized by drawing upon reserve stocks of grain, in 1928, found no reserve in the graneries. In these circumstances, it would be expected that large shipments of grain would have been brought in to accessible famine areas from Manchuria or the other regions where grain was abundant. In 1928-1929, the volume of such shipments was meager. Suffering fell upon many parts of China not primarily as a result of natural causes though sharply accentuated by them; but because the customary, direct and simple means of combatting a poor harvest were not available.

Many artificial or unnatural causes combined to play the leading parts in this story of "famine".

For several years China had been ravaged by civil war. It was a many-sided, kaleidoscopic war. In the future it may be possible to look back and see that underlying the fighting and disorder, great principles were struggling for expression as was the case in the French revolution. But in the years 1927-1928 the conflict bore the aspect of a bloody contest between rival ambitious "generals", each in command of his own personally raised and controlled armies, and each one greedy for wealth and power. These generals were constantly making and breaking alliances with each other, fighting today against an ally of yesterday.

As none of these armies had governmental support they all lived off the country wherever they marched or camped. They were ruthless in their relations to the population. They swept the towns, villages, and farms bare of everything which an army could use. They looted banks and shops, and levied tribute on the cities. They seized men and forced them into the ranks. Thousands are said to have joined armies simply because they were thus assured of a living by plunder. Under this regime of terror, farmers lost their grain reserved against a time of trouble and that reserved for next year's seeding. They lost their growing crops which were prematurely cut down by the soldiers or

were used for pasturage for the officers' horses. They lost their donkeys, sows, carts, fowls, and farm equipment.

American readers are familiar with the stories of banditry in China. It is doubtful whether these stories convey any adequate idea of the prevalence of this intolerable evil. Operating in small highly mobile units, free of the necessary discipline of an army, without responsible leadership, they constitute a scourge of major proportions. Probably a majority of bandits are soldiers who have deserted or whose armies have been disbanded. Not infrequently a group of destitute farmers will unite in an armed band and set out to raid distant villages, returning in time and settling down again to peaceful pursuits. An idea of the extent to which this form of outlawry flourished in China may be gained from a petition which a famine relief committee of Kansu presented to General Chiang Kai-shek in July, 1929. This petition, praying for relief for the famine victims, stated that bandits had ravaged 70 of the 78 hsien in Kansu. "Banditry has terrorized the province since 1926", says the petition. "This resulted in the complete destruction of farm implements and animals". It should be added that the famine in Kansu is particularly severe, and that the province has no railroads, and can be reached only by overcoming tremendous difficulties. Transportation of relief supplies is therefore impracticable. Conditions in Kansu have been further aggravated by a Mohammedan uprising in which 50,000 or more persons have been slaughtered.

Crushing taxation has played its part. The generals who have been in control of the provinces have levied exorbitant taxes for the support of armies or for personal enrichment. In some provinces these taxes have been ruthlessly collected for several years in advance. All of a man's belongings may be seized to meet these payments if he is unable to pay cash.

Lack of transportation has played its part. Railroads have been reduced to a fraction of their normal capacity by the activities of the armies. Engines and cars have been seized and held for military uses; have been broken and

worn out and cast aside. Bridges have been destroyed, tracks have been torn up or allowed by neglect to fall into dangerous condition. A large proportion of all the engines and cars belonging to the several railways of northern China were seized by the late Marshal Chang Tso-lin and taken into Manchuria in the spring of 1928. Many are still held there by the Marshal's son and successor.

Thus it becomes plain that the famine of 1928-1929 does not fit into the definition, "Famine is a failure of food supply due primarily to natural causes". On the contrary, natural causes here and there have intensified the breadth and depth of the destitution which years of civil war and lawlessness and general disorganization have created. Also it becomes plain that the line between normal and famine living conditions is often imperceptible; and equally plain becomes the reason for the wide discrepancies among estimates of the famine's extent and severity.

APPENDIX III

Famine Relief Methods

Agencies engaged in relief of famine sufferers in China have employed a variety of methods which may be enumerated as follows:

1. Distribution of money to individuals.
2. Distribution of grain to individuals.
3. Maintenance of gruel kitchens.
4. Sale of grain at a price below the prevailing rate.
5. Removal of population.
6. Employment upon construction projects.

Each of these methods has advantages and each is open to objection. Some elaboration will make this clear. It will be noted that both questions of principle and manner of administration are involved.

1. Distribution of Money to Individuals

This is the simplest of all methods of relief. Its directness, the promptness with which it may be applied where needed, the fact that the gift can be made without trouble or thought by the giver and that it is probably the most welcome form of relief to the recipient; all these considerations tempt the holder of relief funds to adopt this device.

Perhaps no method is more readily abused or less effective in actual application. The fact that famine exists signifies that food can be bought only with difficulty, or at best is abnormally expensive. The small amount of money allotted to the individual or family can obtain but a meager amount of relief. Experience has shown in innumerable instances in many countries that the recipients of cash relief waste it or buy unwisely, and that in a large proportion of cases the money is quickly exhausted, leaving the beneficiary in as bad a plight as before. This method of relief also offers the widest opportunities for graft or misapplication of funds.

2. Distribution of Grain to Individuals

In China agricultural districts, every family or village possesses the primitive mechanism employed for crushing

grain into the coarse meal used in the preparation of the foods to which the people are accustomed. When grain is supplied direct to the villages affected, the famine victims are not required to leave their own localities to enjoy the benefit of the relief given them. Also, the needy population can devote itself to its usual household and community activities and to such work as may be possible in keeping the land in condition for prompt resumption of crop cultivation when the famine has passed. This method avoids disorganization of family and community life, and the consequent loss of time and effort in restoring normal conditions. It is inexpensive in administration, and probably carries more relief per dollar expended than any other method today in use in China.

Urged against this method is the fact that it is not accompanied by any test or measure of the extent of the actual need of the individual or family. No compensating labor is exacted. The people may, if they wish, sit in idleness while food is given them. It is held by some observers that this tends to encourage dependence and retard prompt return to self support when the opportunity occurs. Racial characteristics and age long customs of life among the Chinese rural population are believed to minimize the weakening influence of such a free distribution of grain.

3. Maintenance of Gruel Kitchens

Under this method cooked food, usually a form of thick porridge, is distributed. Care can be taken to assure that the food is wholesome and nourishing, and waste can be almost completely avoided. Famine refugees who have wandered away from their villages in search of food lack the facilities for crushing grain, and are often without the simple utensils required for cooking. For persons of this class, the gruel kitchen is a cheap and effective means of relief.

It is only when the needy population is gathered close about the kitchen and when it is absent from its own villages and farms that the gruel kitchen is acceptable as an emergency relief device. If in order to benefit from a kitchen, an individual must leave home, or must travel a

long distance between his house and the kitchen daily or at frequent intervals, the grain distribution would appear to possess obvious advantages. In short, gruel kitchens would seem to have a tendency to draw people away from their homes, to retard their return, and consequently to be a disruptive influence in the family and village life.

When famine conditions grow severe farm people have the inclination to drift to the larger towns of the district in search of food. In these centers, it not infrequently occurs that large numbers of famine refugees will congregate, helpless to do anything for themselves. So long as no human means are available for dispersing these groups, the gruel kitchen is perhaps a justifiable temporary relief device, although it must tend constantly to draw increasing numbers, and to prevent the uprooted dependents from returning to home and self support.

4. Sale of Grain at a Price Below Prevailing Rate

In China, this method of relief is known as "P'ing T'iao." As conducted in the famine of 1928-1929, grain is purchased in Manchuria, shipped to a famine district, and sold at cost in small quantities to selected individual famine victims who have means to purchase it. This not alone enables a certain part of the population to avoid dependence upon the bounty of the relief agency, but its presence in the district has an influence in keeping down the market price of grain in the hands of hoarders and speculators. Almost invariably stocks of grain are held for sale in famine regions at exorbitant prices.

"P'ing T'iao" may well be a valuable adjunct of other methods of relief, but its use is always restricted since the chief sufferers from famine are naturally those who lack the means to buy grain.

5. Removal of Population

For years men from the crowded province of Shantung have gone each spring to Manchuria where farm labor is in demand, and have returned to Shantung in the fall. In 1928, when famine prevailed in some parts of Shantung, it was natural enough that the movement to Manchuria

was very much increased. The emigration in fact assumed such dimensions that railroads and steamships could not accommodate the crowds. It was estimated that the total movement involved 1,000,000 persons. Many thousand men traveled the long distance, perhaps 500 miles or more, on foot. Without prearrangement or leadership, the exodus was accompanied by severe hardship and many of the refugees failed to find employment.

This experience set relief agencies to thinking. Famine regions were choked with idle, hungry people. Under normal conditions, they were barely able to keep starvation away. In Manchuria are vast areas of uncultivated lands thinly populated. In 1929, a beginning was made of systematically sending organized parties of farmers to Manchuria where they are welcomed by provincial authorities and large land owners and given liberal opportunities to establish themselves on the soil. Chinese railroads provide free transportation, and famine relief agencies organize the parties, arrange with the Manchurian authorities for their reception, and pay the cost of their food en route. This movement cannot solve the famine problem, but it can at least open new doors of opportunity to many thousand persons, otherwise doomed to a hopeless struggle for existence. By August, 1929, the committee in control of this movement in Honan province had sent over 10,000 persons from the famine districts of that province to new lives in Manchuria.

6. Employment Upon Construction Projects

On the occasion of the China famine of 1920-21, a relief fund of several million dollars was collected in the United States. For the expenditure of this large sum, a special organization was created in Peiping composed of Chinese and foreign residents in equal numbers. This organization was eventually given the name "China International Famine Relief Commission." It distributed free relief to famine sufferers for the most part.

Coincidental with this relief operation by the Relief Commission, the American Red Cross contributed \$1,000,000 for famine relief, an amount later increased to approxi-

mately \$1,250,000. It was decided not to merge the Red Cross gift with the fund which had been raised in America by popular subscription for the famine, but to expend it under separate management in an important experiment in relief by employment. This experiment, under the leadership of John Earl Baker, chiefly took the form of constructing roads, with well-digging as a secondary activity. Approximately 800 miles of roads were constructed by famine labor. The laborers, who were paid in food, received enough to meet the minimum requirements of their families. Roads were built where none already existed, and where they would benefit the country; they would facilitate the movement of crops and merchandise, and it was believed would tend toward a better preparation for meeting future famines.

The Red Cross experiment thus left a permanent addition to the assets of the country as a by-product of its relief operation, while the relief operation conducted by the Famine Relief Commission left little in the form of material improvement. The comparison between the parallel efforts was much commented upon, and when a little later the Famine Relief Commission decided to convert itself into a permanent famine relief agency, it adapted the principle of relief by employment. Since 1921, therefore, the China International Famine Relief Commission has been the leader and chief exponent of this idea in China, and has executed a considerable number of engineering projects for the purpose of affording relief to needy communities. As a means of ascertaining the value and the deficiencies of this important principle of relief-giving an examination of the history and the development of the China International Famine Relief Commission is of exceptional interest. From a statement prepared by the Commission, the following excerpts contain an outline of the essential steps in this development:

"The earlier idea was to keep people alive, as many as possible and as long as possible. To accomplish this 'free relief' was given out in the form of doles of food—the amount given to each person being just enough to keep him alive. The number of people fed and the time

for which the free relief was continued was determined by the amount of money available.

"The next stage was marked by the development of 'labor relief'. On various undertakings, such as road-making, dyke construction or repair, the manufacture of saleable articles, etc. Famine victims were given an opportunity to earn the relief which they received. But the money—or the food purchased with the money—was given outright.

"Then those concerned with famine problems began to ask why some at least of the money should not come back for subsequent use in other famine relief or preventive undertakings. The projects carried through as labor relief undertakings were permanent benefits to the communities or the individuals concerned. In many cases they were potential sources of direct and entirely legitimate revenue. Why, therefore, should not the cost of their construction be considered as loan advances, to be paid back out of the income which properly could be expected?"

As against this evolution in policies the same statement from which the foregoing excerpts are quoted describes the normal human impulse:

"Face to face with thousands of people in dire distress because of lack of food, the normal first impulse is to take whatever money is available, buy food with it and give the food to as many starving people as possible."

and in a later paragraph points out the result of yielding to this impulse:

"When the money has been spent, absolutely nothing has been accomplished to prevent the recurrence of famine or to make relief work easier when famine did recur—and a study of the records showed that China has suffered regularly and at comparatively brief intervals, from famine due to drought or flood."

It is clear that the policy of the China International Famine Relief Commission is the outgrowth of experience and study. Broadly speaking its conclusions are in harmony with those of students of charity administration in the United States. However, qualifying factors are so many and varied that every instance of collective need constitutes a separate problem. Especially is this true with

the later development by which the China International Famine Relief Commission converts its labor policy into an instrument for transmuting emergency relief funds into permanent revolving funds or endowment funds with a by-product of earnings from such funds available for meeting the necessary expenses of the China International Famine Relief Commission. Money given for the relief of suffering constitutes a sacred trust. The reason for any diversion of the funds which turns them from the straight line of relief, which perpetuates them and converts them and their accretions eventually to purposes for which the money was not given, should be so crystal clear to all concerned, so transparently free from any suspicion of selfish or mercenary color, that criticism would fall to the ground.

A substantial diversity of opinion exists among intelligent observers in China concerning certain aspects of China International Famine Relief Committee policy and operation.

One mooted question is that of permanency and continuity. On the one side, it is maintained that these qualities make for promptness and efficiency when a famine occurs; that loss of valuable time otherwise consumed in organizing and equipping a relief committee is saved; that expert personnel can be retained only by continuous employment. On the other side it is pointed out that a permanent organization involves continuing expense from one famine to the next for salaries and other items of upkeep; that inasmuch as the life of the organization depends on receipts from relief contributions there must always exist, perhaps unconsciously, an urge to discover in every period of serious crop deficiency a reason for calling on the public for contributions, before thoroughly exploiting the possibility of meeting the situation by more normal methods, such as through organizing the resources of the affected district or provinces, by inducing action by governmental officials or bureaus, by persuading railway companies to generous helpfulness, or by encouraging native relief societies to meet the situation without asking foreign help.

A closely related question on which differing views are held is whether the permanent existence of an active,

widely advertised international relief organization which draws its income chiefly from foreign countries, does not tend to prevent native initiative and sense of responsibility. One reason which has been advanced for the comparatively meager share taken by the Chinese well-to-do classes and Chinese official agencies in the relief of famines, is the fact that foreign generosity has so often taken the lead and borne the brunt of the burden in periods of famine. With reference to the attempt to raise \$4,000,000 in America for China famine relief last year, a well-informed foreign resident of Peiping is authority for the statement that rich Chinese now living in that city could have contributed the total amount without any material handicap.

As to the policy of constructing engineering projects from relief funds, and in particular upon a loan basis, there has been found to be a considerable body of adverse opinion. This may be classified as follows:

a. It is always impossible to reach all the sufferers in a famine by providing employment on such works. Inevitably the fund goes to the employment of a comparatively small proportion of the people in need and to their families. A serious famine extends over an area of many hundreds, perhaps thousands of square miles. The extent of the relief project is small by comparison and distant from much of the famine area. This operates naturally to the advantage of those who live nearest the works. In the famine of 1929 in the province of Suiyuan, it was estimated that 2,000,000 persons were affected. The irrigation project set up to provide relief by employment offered work to 15,000 men. The earnings of that number of laborers paid in grain might conceivably have fed, say 75,000 persons.

b. Relief engineering projects require important expenditures for expert administration and for the purchase of materials and equipment, by so much reducing the amount of the relief fund found available for actual relief. In the Suiyuan irrigation operation, for illustration, added to such expenditures was a railroad charge of over \$30,000 (silver) for transporting tools, concrete, etc., from Peiping to the site of the work. Stone for walls and other necessary materials also had to be purchased.

c. Engineering works constructed as relief measures generally benefit that part of the population able to support itself and pay for such improvements. If roads are constructed, they primarily benefit the owners of vehicles, draft animals, and other modes of transportation. The narrow-tired carts and wheelbarrows, in almost universal use in China, destroy the soft roadways, and for that reason have usually been forbidden to use them. Irrigation systems benefit land owners, of whom a large percentage might well pay their share of the cost of construction. Not infrequently organizations and individual holders of large tracts of land benefit from these projects.

d. In order to equalize the benefits mentioned in the preceding paragraph (c), the China International Famine Relief Commission has adopted the policy of requiring the land owners to repay the cost of the improvement in annual installments extending over a series of years. This arrangement makes necessary a complicated and expensive system of accounting and collection, the expense of supervising the irrigation works, and the perpetuation of relief organization years beyond the disappearance of the famine. As the annual payments come in from the irrigated lands, they are not needed for the famine, long since ended; they cannot be given back to the original contributors; therefore they go into the assets or the working capital of China International Famine Relief Commission, where they and their accretions of interest may be applied to relief of future famines, to further engineering famine prevention projects, or to the operating expenses or the endowment funds of the organization.

e. The policy described in the preceding paragraph as applied to an irrigation project is equally applicable to other classes of construction projects; to well digging, dyke building, road construction, or land reclamation. It is also applicable to "P'ing T'iao," the device of selling grain in famine regions at approximately cost price. This brings the money back into the China International Famine Relief Commission treasury directly and promptly as compared with the long drawn returns from construction projects. P'ing T'iao proceeds may therefore be used two or three

times over in the period of a single famine, passing into the assets of the China International Famine Relief Commission when the famine is ended.

It is evident that the progressive and unfolding policies above described have led us quite a long distance from the point at which the American people were responding to such frantic appeals as these:

"Have you ever seen a starving child? Once seen it is never to be forgotten. There is no coloring in its voice—its cry is a monotone. It knows only one word—and that is, "Bread, Bread, Bread."

"Give a dollar and save a life!"

"Again it becomes the responsibility of the American People to Save Millions of Lives."

"The response must be immediate, or it will be too late!"

Now, by a logical and sensible series of steps, the dollar given to save a life has helped create and is helping to maintain in China a large, permanent organization with a staff of executives, engineers, accountants and clerical personnel. The dollar given in a moment of tender pity by Mrs. Mary Smith in Williamsport, Pennsylvania, now forms part of the invested funds of the China International Famine Relief Commission, and the income from her dollar is applied to the support of extensive and varied activities of which Mrs. Smith has never heard.

There can be no doubt that a question of ethics is involved here, but what is it exactly? The China International Famine Relief Commission openly and enthusiastically proclaims its faith in employment as the best method of relief giving, and as a general principle, it is likely that informed opinion would support this position. Water which has turned one mill wheel can quite properly turn another farther down stream. Why then should not Mrs. Smith's dollar, after turning a wheel in the relief operation, for which it was given, be properly applied to other wheels of different kinds? Has not Mrs. Smith received the worth of her dollar in its first application, and why should she have any interest in its later activities?

Answers to the questions raised here take two forms:

The first is that if Mrs. Smith gave her dollar with full and approving understanding of how it was to be used and perpetuated and applied in future activities, she has no reason to find fault with the course of events. If, however, she gave her dollar in the belief that it would go straight to a starving famine sufferer, carrying its full value in food, she has cause for complaint. Has there not been a failure on the part of some parties to this operation to make plain to American givers exactly what disposition is made of their givings?

There can be little doubt that many American givers, moved by the intensely urgent appeals to which they have responded, would learn with disappointment of the months which have elapsed before their contributions have reached the famine sufferers through the slow process of relief construction works. For instance, the famine in the province of Suiyuan was reported to be very severe in December, 1928, with millions threatened with starvation. Apparently conditions grew worse until about March, 1929, when moderate rains brought improvement which continued. Meanwhile, the China International Famine Relief Commission was planning a relief irrigation project for the Suiyuan famine area. This required land surveys and much preliminary work. Excavating tools, timber, stone, cement, etc., had to be obtained, and transported to the site, and an administrative organization created. Actual employment of famine sufferers began about July 1, 1929, and by the middle of July, nearly 10,000 men were employed. Then abundant rains fell, and the laborers rushed back to their farms to plant and cultivate, leaving on August 1 only 3,000 men on the job.

This project is expected to cost \$300,000 gold, of which one-half is to be borne by the provincial government, and one-half by the relief fund from the United States. With the famine virtually at an end in Suiyuan province, it leaves the China International Famine Relief Commission in an embarrassing situation, committed to a heavy expenditure of relief funds after the need of relief has passed.

The second answer to the ethical question indicated above is to be found in the assumption that money given in the

United States in response to such appeals as have been always made here, must in good faith, be so expended as to save from famine the largest possible number of persons. This assumption would sweep aside construction relief projects, which, while providing preventive measures against future famine, sacrifice many present sufferers who might be saved by less expensive and more widely applicable methods, such for instance as the free distribution of grain in the villages of famine areas.

Finally, in this analysis of the extended and important work of the China International Famine Relief Commission, reference should be made to the belief strongly held by some thoughtful foreign residents of China, that its permanence and continuity are not for the common good. These observers are convinced that the advantages before mentioned, namely the assurance of prompt action when a famine occurs, and the ever ready presence of an organization of trained personnel, are outweighed by the disadvantages.

Those who hold this view find objection to the heavy overhead expenses which continue from one famine to the next. They believe that permanence cultivates the growth of bureaucracy in the organization, and tends to allow control of policies and expenditures to drift gradually and unwisely into the hands of the paid staff. They argue that a famine comes on gradually with months of warning to the world, thus allowing ample time to create an adequate emergency relief organization which would function effectively while needed, then disband and stop all expense until another serious famine crisis arose. They believe strong, influential men, both native and foreign, would always be willing to give of their time and experience for temporary service in such emergencies, thus bringing new interest and new viewpoints to the recurring tasks.

And perhaps most important of all considerations, in the thought of those whose opinions are here voiced, is the belief that the Chinese people themselves, acting through governmental or private agencies, would be readier to respond to the call of distress among their own, if there were not a permanent international relief body always ready and

anxious to assume responsibility, and to invite foreign countries to carry the burden.

Men whose views are thus quoted generally pay tribute to the value of the work which the China International Famine Relief Commission has accomplished. Some of them believe it should reorganize its activities in such a manner as to eliminate famine relief from its purposes, and concentrate its full force upon cooperation with governmental agencies in the construction of engineering projects which would advance the welfare of the farmers. This would at once remove all criticism growing out of the collection and use of relief funds, as well as of the system of placing such projects upon a loan basis.

APPENDIX IV

Famine Relief by Chinese Governmental Agencies

Precise information as to the participation of the National and provincial governments in famine relief was not available to the American Red Cross Commission. Numerous reports have been published, but these deal in general terms with conditions and objectives. The actual progress of the relief funds from their source through to their final disposition cannot be ascertained from these publications. Absence of coordination or cooperation among the provinces and between the National Government and provinces proved a further barrier to the collection of comprehensive data while an apparent tendency toward secrecy in regard to the basis for the division and allotment of funds defeated the inquiries of many interested persons. The general lack of knowledge of what was actually being done by the Government for famine relief, without doubt was responsible in a measure for the circulation of stories and rumors reflecting unfavorably upon the manner in which the official bodies are disposing of their relief funds.

Members of the American Red Cross Commission found generally an air of reserve or of open cynicism with regard to this subject. Many commentators expressed the belief that political and personal interests were fostered to the disadvantage of the famine sufferers. Repeatedly the explanation was given that this character of diversion of funds has so long been the recognized custom in China that "graft" or its Chinese equivalent, "squeeze," is common and that the people accept without protest the practice of officials keeping for personal gain some portion of public monies passing through their hands.

This Commission has no direct evidence of any such diversion of relief funds, but the lack of definite information as to the exact disposition made of funds, the absence of those safeguards of accounting and auditing usual in other countries, the widely current allegations and rumors of misapplication and the well known and undisputed preva-

lence of the practice of squeeze—all these things must be considered in order to convey a balanced impression of the setting and atmosphere by which the Government's famine relief activities are surrounded.

The National Government, in March, 1929, announced an issue of \$10,000,000 famine relief bonds. These bonds were placed in charge of an official Famine Relief Commission which later reported that it has distributed most of these bonds to the provincial governments. It was for the provinces to sell their quotas of these bonds if they were actually to obtain cash for famine relief. Some bonds were reported sold by provinces at a price around 66 per cent of par value. No reports are available showing how much money has been realized by the provinces from these bond sales or to what specific use the proceeds have been applied.

The heads of two large banks, one foreign and one Chinese, were consulted by the American Red Cross Commission with regard to the Government bond issue. Both men had made some effort to ascertain what had been done with the bonds. Both admitted failure. The Chinese banker stated that he had learned that \$3,000,000 of the bonds had been given to General Feng Yu-hsiang for the support of his large army, now lying idle and living in part off the countryside and in part from arbitrary exactions from the earnings of certain railroads. A representative of the China International Famine Relief Commission on a visit to the province of Honan was informed that that province had received bonds of par value of \$800,000 and had sold the greater part of them in Shanghai at a price of 66 per cent of par—that around August 1 the cash proceeds were lying in bank. At that time the famine in Honan had substantially disappeared with the exception of a small area in the extreme western part of the province. In the province of Shansi it was reported that bonds of \$500,000 par value had been sold for around \$300,000 and that the proceeds had been expended in buying grain for the famine area of that province.

Confusion in China as to the distinction between famine and the chronic destitution which blankets the country is

well shown by the report of the Famine Relief Commission which states that: "Such is the extent of the worst famine in this country that twenty-two provinces are affected and the stricken population is over 65,000,000." At the same time the China International Famine Relief Commission places the number of famine affected provinces at nine with an affected population estimated at 20,000,000 and the American Advisory Committee in Peiping fixes 4,000,000 as its estimate of the number of reachable sufferers from famine resulting from "failure of food supply due primarily to natural causes." In this connection it is pertinent to refer to the deliberate conclusion of Henry Kittredge Norton, in his book, *China and the Powers* that "30,000,000 persons in China are continually attempting to sustain life on less than the minimum required for subsistence. . . . Of the famine that is present every day we hear little; and the three million or more that die each year of starvation . . . are accepted as representing the normal mortality of the Chinese people."

Adhering to its expanded estimate of the extent of the famine, the Famine Relief Commission distributed its \$10,000,000 of relief bonds among eighteen provinces. It will be noted that these bonds are based on the value of the Mexican dollar which at the average rate of exchange in the summer of 1929 would give the entire issue a gold value of approximately \$4,500,000. If the issue were all sold at 66 per cent of par value, the total proceeds from the sale would approximate \$3,000,000 gold.

The fragmentary data presented in the several preceding paragraphs illustrates the uncertainty which obscures the record of the relief bond issue and at the same time affords some explanation of the difficulty of obtaining basic information necessary for the intelligent guidance of foreign relief agencies.

In addition to the national bond issue, several provinces have created relief funds, through tax levies or loans, but the number of such instances or the amounts involved are not known to your Commission. No single fact of the attempt to obtain reliable information concerning the extent

of governmental famine relief was more puzzling than the almost complete absence of cooperation, neighborly sympathy or understanding of each other's problems or activities among the provinces. They seemed more like different nations with clashing interests and sharply marked frontiers than sister divisions of a single great country.

In a printed report dated April 30, 1929 (the latest report issued) the national Famine Relief Commission summarizes its receipts and disbursements as follows:

Receipts — National Bonds.....(Mex)	\$9,000,000.00
Contributions	162,571.70
Disbursements—National Bonds....(Mex)	\$8,830,000.00
Contributions	99,509.43
Balance on Hand—National Bonds.....	170,000.00
Contributions	63,062.27

Apparently, three contributions recorded by the Famine Relief Commission and distributed to the provinces, are not included in this summary but may be properly shown here:

Oversea Chinese contributions.....(Mex)	\$340,000
Shensi-Honan-Kansu Committee.....(Mex)	277,000
Grain by Northeastern Famine Relief Committee (Manchuria) valued at	(Mex) 300,000

Certain other relief measures have been taken by the National Government: It has provided free railway transportation for food supplies for the famine areas; it has removed customs duties or other taxes on relief supplies, and it has undertaken to protect famine relief workers from bandits and is giving free transportation on railroads for the emigration of famine sufferers from Honan to Manchuria.

The national Famine Relief Commission has laid before the Government a plan for the prevention of future famines. The Government has not yet acted upon this project or given any indication of its probable attitude toward it. The plan, while perhaps idealistic, in some degree, contains sound elements which might well become the basis for an intelligent attack upon the famine peril. Following is a copy of the scheme as presented to the government:

Draft Regulations for Famine Prevention

ARTICLE I. The National Government, with a view to preventing famine in the Country and to regulating the livelihood of the people, shall appropriate an annual sum of \$5,000,000 from the budget of the Ministry of the Interior. The amount shall be appropriated in two installments, one in April and the other in October of the year.

ARTICLE II. The fund thus earmarked shall be appropriated in the following manner:

A.—In case of existent famine:

1. Purchasing of rice and selling it in famine districts at cost price.
2. Giving immediate relief to famine sufferers.
3. Conducting constructive work by employing famine sufferers.

B.—In years of plenty:

1. Conservancy work.
2. Cultivation of forests.
3. Emigration for reclamation purposes.
4. Road construction.
5. Organization of Trust Corporations.
6. Storage of surplus rice.
7. Other constructive works adopted by plenary meetings of the Famine Relief Commission.

ARTICLE III. The famine prevention foundation fund shall not be diverted to any uses other than those stipulated in Article II of the Regulations.

ARTICLE IV. The yearly appropriation of \$5,000,000 in question from the National Budget shall never be discontinued and this appropriation shall be stipulated in the National Constitution when it is drafted.

shall be specially organized by the Government for the purpose.

ARTICLE VI. In case of appropriation of the said fund the approval of three members of the Standing Committee of the Board of Directors of the People's Bank shall be required. The Directors shall be appointed by the National Government, but government officials shall not surpass one-third of the total number, others being chosen from among distinguished Chinese and oversea merchants.

ARTICLE VII. The regulations governing the organization of the People's Bank shall be drafted by the Government.

ARTICLE VIII. The Government shall appoint a Famine Relief Commission to take charge of all affairs relating to famine prevention and relief, the organization of which shall be decided upon by the Government. The members of the Standing Committee of the Board of Directors of the People's Bank shall also be members of the Standing Committee of the Famine Relief Commission.

ARTICLE IX. This regulation is subject to revisions by the Administrative Meeting of the National Government and such revisions shall be made by orders of the Government.

ARTICLE X. The regulation shall take effect from the date of its promulgation.

APPENDIX V

Population

From United States Department of Commerce publications, it will be seen that more than half of China is comprised in vast outlying regions sparsely inhabited and only nominally under her control. These remote areas are chiefly embraced in the great districts known as Mongolia, Tibet and Chinese Turkestan. China, including these loosely held territories, contains more than 4,000,000 square miles and a population estimated at 446,000,000. An average based on these figures gives a population of 104 persons per square mile. This average is exceeded by several other countries.

From a further study of these authorities it is seen that to obtain a truer picture it is necessary to cut off the outlying three great provinces above mentioned by which we subtract 2,385,000 square miles and only 10,200,000 people. This leaves what may be called China proper, with 1,897,000 square miles, and a population of 436,000,000 people, thus giving an average of 238 persons per square mile. But even these figures fail to bring out the most significant facts. By eliminating the outlying provinces of Manchuria, Kansu, and Yunnan, we find 398,000,000 persons living at the rate of 315 per square mile. In a few provinces the density of population far exceeds these figures. Shantung's 30,800,000 people live 552 per square mile; Honan's 30,850,000 are 454 per square mile; Chekiang's 22,000,000 are 601 per square mile, and Kiangsu's 33,800,000 average 875 for each square mile.

Here is a population problem which defies solution by any available means. It is not China's problem alone, it is a world problem. China seems to be approaching a period at which her land cannot support her people. By economies undreamed in America, the Chinese people are still able to sustain themselves on the land. But so delicate is the balance between food supply and need that any serious interruption in the regular routine of existence precipitates disaster.

It has been estimated that by the end of this century, China's population will be double its present total, unless the normal increase is checked by tremendous famines, epidemics, and wars. A more intensive cultivation of land in outlying provinces, further encroachment of population upon the mountains, the high plateaus and desert regions of interior, territories, may prolong the period of balance now barely maintained.

Other countries look to the acquisition of new lands for the accommodation of their overcrowded people. China's problem is far too great to find adequate relief by that device. If other nations opened wide their doors to Chinese immigration the result could bring only partial and temporary relief. Imagine 50,000,000 Chinese swarming into other lands. Years would be required for the movement and the population increase during that period would probably equal the loss by emigration. A curious computation has been based upon the prediction that the population of China will double itself by the year 2,000. That will mean an average increase of approximately 6,000,000 per year for a period of 71 years. It is estimated that if all the ships in the world now engaged in passenger traffic on the seven seas were withdrawn from their usual routes and were devoted solely to transporting Chinese from their native land to other countries, they could not keep up with the growth of population.

Population Pressure and the Growth of Famine in China

Under this caption, the Chinese Economic Journal, Shanghai, an official publication of the Chinese Government, March, 1929, contains an article by Harry Paxton Howard, which is of such peculiar interest and timely value that comprehensive portions of it have been appended here:

"Famine is only rarely and exceptionally the result of natural catastrophes. Floods, droughts or deluges may be the apparent and immediate cause of a serious food shortage which may involve the death of millions of persons, but the basic cause is the lack of any eco-

conomic margin in normal years. Almost everywhere in the world there are fluctuations in food production, good harvests and bad harvests, but a poor harvest does not mean famine unless there is a people living so close to the existence margin that a temporary shortage leaves large numbers below this margin. Even such calamities as floods and earthquakes do not necessarily mean famine. These things are of course axiomatic.

"It is clear that in China it is pressure of population upon the means of subsistence that has long been the basic cause of famine, whatever may be the immediate causes. A recent article in the Chinese Economic Journal on *Famines in Shantung* (Jan., 1928) points out the population pressure in that province, with a density of 550 or more persons to the square mile in a territory, which, like nearly all of China, is predominantly agricultural. In this thickly populated province—the most populous of China up to a century and a half ago—famine is not an occasional, but of frequent occurrence. It has been so for many centuries. In 229 years, from 1412 to 1641 A. D., twenty-one famines are recorded—one for every ten and nine-tenths years. The situation is no better today, the only difference being in the greater amount and more practical nature of the outside relief accorded the famine victims—thereby permitting the population to continue to increase. Not indeed that the increase ever ceased for any great length of time, for as soon as any considerable excess was removed by the 'natural' method of starvation, the process at once was continued of producing new victims to take their places. In 1749 the population was over twenty-four million. In 1842 it was twenty-nine and a half million. Today it is in the neighborhood of thirty-five million. Statistics of farm land indicate that the tiny plots of two centuries ago are being further reduced. In 1766, the farm land per capita was 3.8 mow, in 1812 it was 3.4 mow, at the present time it is 3.3 mow.

"Growth of Population

" . . . There is no reason to suppose that the population of China is increasing at a much slower rate today than it was a century or a century and a half ago. Taking all data into consideration, however, it seems safe to state definitely that the Chinese people are now increasing at a rate between 1.1-1.5 per annum, that

the population is far greater today than it has ever been at any previous period, and that (barring some widespread civil war and famine comparable to that of the Taiping period) it will double itself before the end of the present century—if the food supply holds out. . . .

"Checks to Population Growth"

"The natural checks to population growth are famine, war and pestilence, plus such other intermittent calamities as earthquakes, floods, tidal waves, etc. Checks of this kind, it seems, operate with all animal life. With the development by human beings of a certain control over nature, however, there has followed an increasing substitution of artificial for natural checks. Infanticide is the most primitive of these artificial checks. Abortion indicates a higher stage of development. Contraception is the method of the civilized minority of the human race.

"In China so far the principal checks to population growth have been the natural ones—particularly if we include war in this category. Famine is the most widespread of these checks. The tendency of the population is to grow until it presses hard upon the limit of subsistence. When this stage is reached, a poor harvest will mean starvation for many. Local destruction caused by civil war or the pillaging of troops may have the same effect. But a normal year will mean a temporary recovery of the population which will again continue its growth until another difficult period intervenes.

"Of the artificial checks, far the most common in China is infanticide. This primitive method is the only one which appears to be so widespread as to affect population figures appreciably. Its influence is seen in the disparity between the male and female population, as it is usually girl babies who are the victims of infanticide. The actual amount of this disparity it is difficult to determine, but Dr. Buck's calculations give the ratio as 114 males to 100 females, which is probably fairly indicative.

"Abortion, though used to some extent in China, is probably not practiced by the mass of the people sufficiently to affect population totals seriously. As for contraceptive measures, these are known only to an infinitesimal minority of people—if we except certain traditional methods which appear to be of little effect.

Polyandry may check population growth in a few localities, some in Fukien for example.

"The main population checks, therefore, are natural ones—food shortage, disease and catastrophic occurrences such as floods. Infanticide is a factor of some importance. There have also been periods when war was of serious import, though usually it directly affects but a small minority of the people.

"But all these checks have not been sufficient to keep the Chinese population from growing at a rate which has now made China the most populous state in the world—and the one most subject to famine.

"The Famine Area

"The pressure of population against the means of subsistence being the basic cause of famine, it follows that the regions longest populated will be those most subject to famine, and the only districts where it assumes a chronic character. This is the case. The provinces of China most subject to serious famines are Shensi, Shansi, Honan, Chihli, and Shantung. These regions, in about the order given, are the oldest settled districts of China. Their population (between famines) is still increasing, it appears, though the frequent checks prevent any such continual growth as characterizes the newer provinces to the south.

"The earliest records of the Chinese people indicate that their first centers of population were in the district now known as Shensi—spreading eastward—and to the south and north from there. Alexander Hosie's compilation of data from the T'u Shu Tsih Ch'eng on droughts and famines over a thousand years show the most extreme conditions to have been most frequent in these longest-settled districts. In at least fifteen of the worst years the Chinese records allude to cannibalism. The extreme is reached most often in Shensi—which is quite to be expected. It also occurs—but less frequently—in Honan, Shansi, and Shantung. It is referred to only once or twice in the provinces further south.

"There is a possibility which should be mentioned here, that inland provinces such as Shensi may be subject to that general process of desiccation which has characterized central Asia for many thousands of years, drying up broad rivers and great inland lakes, transforming rich forest land into arid deserts such as we know in Sinkiang today. While this is a possi-

bility, however, there is no very precise data on it in Chinese records, which show wide fluctuations but no regular increase in the number of droughts in Shensi in historic times. But it should be noted that the historic records of droughts are by no means complete. They are not the result of measured rainfall from year to year and from century to century, but the records of periods when there was such crop failure as to bring starvation to great numbers of people.

"As Walter Mallory of the China International Famine Relief Commission remarks in his invaluable book on *China: Land of Famine* in this respect:

" 'It was only when crops failed and starvation conditions occurred that drought was recognized as drought. Hence it is natural that the more densely populated provinces . . . occur most often in the records, for here a lack of rain and the failure of the crops would most quickly bring about a state of famine.'

"As the Chinese occupation of the country pressed southward, and as the settlers would steadily increase their numbers in a colonized district, the newer regions would begin to appear in the records of drought and famine, as their population began to press upon the means of subsistence so that a bad year or a flood would mean serious conditions. So far the 'famine area' is mainly in the north, but there are indications that it is spreading south with the unchecked growth of population in the newer districts.

"Relief of Population Pressure

" . . . As for the relief of population pressure by industrial development or the exploitation of natural resources other than the agricultural land, this has been of limited effect. Fisheries affect but a small minority of the population in a few provinces, and the same applies to mines and still scarcer forests. As for industrial development, the oldest industry (silk production) does not appear to be increasing relative to population, while the new industrial development can relieve the situation only in certain localities. Far the most important commercial and industrial center in China is Shanghai which also handles the products of Wusih, Soochow, and other points as well as those of village industries. This great center, however, does not absorb a number of persons even equal to the

increase of population of the province wherein it is located. The increase in the population of Kiangsu during the past forty years was about thirteen million, while the total non-agrarian population in the province today (including non-industrial) is only eleven million.

"Taking the yearly increase in the population of China as a whole, industrial development is absorbing a very small proportion, and does not seem likely to do much more than continue to do so. Also it must be remembered that industrial development is a double-edged weapon, frequently disemploying large numbers of craftsmen.

"Flood control, irrigation and land reclamation may temporarily relieve pressure in some districts—but these methods are being adopted only where famine is already frequent. Colonization has taken up considerable numbers, and if it is developed to take up a quarter of a million yearly (a task of enormous difficulty) it will absorb perhaps four per cent of the yearly excess. More equal distribution of wealth, and elimination of economic waste, would temporarily improve matters in most localities, but would not touch the fundamental problem—the pressure of population upon the means of subsistence.

"All the above methods of relief, taken together and developed to their fullest extent, might possibly take up a fairly large fraction of the yearly increase in the Chinese population, easing the pressure by so much, but taking the country as a whole the principal relief appears still to consist of disease, flood, war, or intermittent famine which becomes chronic as the population further increases. Even these checks, however, together with infanticide are insufficient, as is shown by the continued increase of population even in the present famine area, to do more than alter the rate of increase.

"The Growth of Famine

"Summarizing the available data, it would appear that the pressure of population upon the means of subsistence is growing throughout China. In the oldest parts of China where this development has been longest in progress, famines have reached a frequency which may fairly be termed chronic. Shensi, which is possibly the oldest region settled by the Chinese, shows famine conditions reaching a frequency prior

to the Ming Dynasty of about one famine in 20 years, and with the continued increase in population becoming now twice as frequent—averaging every ten years. The famine area of China corresponds roughly to the oldest settled parts of China.

“Normally, the part of the country next to suffer from population pressure would be the adjoining regions to the south and southwest, these being the main directions of migration. That these regions have been gradually affected is clear both from the record of increasing famines and that of droughts and floods (which as noted above are in the main records of serious food shortage). This process was delayed, however, by the development of rice cultivation and by more frequent crops. Furthermore, the rapid growth here (particularly evident in the early settled eastern sections) was checked during the last century by the war and famines of the Taipin period—a check from which it has not yet completely recovered. Owing to this check, the districts further south and southwest have by their rapid and steadier increase almost come to equal the population pressure of the central districts—already approaching that of the northern.

“Accordingly the natural development is an extension of the famine area southward. Statistics of farm land and food production are insufficient to predict this extension with exactness with regard to years and districts, though the general tendency is unquestionable. Various means of utilizing the increase in population economically are insufficient to take care of more than a fractional part of it, though they may be locally effective (e. g., the Shanghai district).

“The present study being one of tendencies, various proposed methods of dealing with the population excess have been but briefly touched upon, so far as they are merely proposals. It seems clear, however, that all proposals which may be regarded as in any way practicable, if put into operation in the fullest possible degree at once, would not do more than take care of a fairly large fraction of the yearly increase.

“Proposals to avoid the population excess by preventative measures go more directly to the root of the problem. It would be a task of many years to establish clinics and spread education in birth control to such an extent as to bring the population increase down to controllable proportions. If such measures are gone into on a large scale, however, in combination with

economic improvements, it might be possible in a decade or two, under the most favorable political and social conditions, to check the steady decline toward famine conditions. (In this connection it would be of great value to have a careful and exact study of population development in Fukien. If the population is on the decline there, as is indicated by the not wholly reliable figures existent, how much of this can be attributed to the practice of polyandry in some districts?)

"It must be recognized, however, that there appear at present no hopeful signs of such a general campaign to cope with population pressure and the inevitable tendency toward famine. The pressure of population against the means of subsistence is of increasing gravity and the 'famine area' seems likely to include most of China long before the end of the present century."

It will be sufficient to close this article by quoting a paragraph or two from Henry Kittredge Norton's arresting study entitled, *China and the Powers*. In his chapter on "China and the Industrial Revolution," Mr. Norton says (p. 173):

"The impact of the industrial revolution on the deliberately balanced economy of China has produced conditions which we find it difficult to comprehend in this country. The old order kept the population just above the starvation line, but the coming of the industrial age has sunk a vast proportion of the people below it. It is estimated that thirty million Chinese are continually attempting to sustain life on less than the minimum required for subsistence. Thousands of these die daily; yet it is only when some great catastrophe such as a flood or a drought concentrates millions of starving in one area that we hear of a famine in China and are asked to contribute to rescue work. Of the famine that is present every day we hear little; and the three million or more that die each year of starvation, due to lack of adjustment to changing conditions, are accepted as representing the normal mortality of the Chinese people."

Again from his chapter on "Undermining the Social Structure" in which he considers checks on the overwhelming growth of population is quoted:

"But famine is the most effective of all the checks. It stalks abroad through the length and breadth of the

land. Now and again some great catastrophe such as a flood or drought increases the number of its victims in one locality and the outer world hears of 'a famine' in China. But 'the famine' is existent in China every day. No sun goes down but marks the passing of thousands dead from starvation. The numbers of the people must be cut down and if disease, war, and plague are not sufficient, famine may be depended upon to fill up the toll."

APPENDIX VI

Standards of Living

In distinguishing and delimiting a famine, difficulty exists which is especially puzzling to a visitor from the United States. This difficulty lies in the low standard of living which ordinarily prevails and is regarded as normal. These standards fall to their lowest levels in the remote rural stretches of the country; the sections, in fact, in which famine most frequently occurs. A well-known American who has lived many years in China and has traveled widely in the interior of the country said to a member of the American Red Cross Commission:

"The line separating normal living from a famine condition is often imperceptible."

Within the last year several independent investigations of the cost of living in China have been made under university auspices or by students of social questions. The result of all such inquiries are substantially similar. The supply of food normally available for the agricultural population in the region away from the railroads and industrial centers is insufficient to meet the minimum requirements for the maintenance of health and strength; in other words the farming population is chronically underfed.

The members of the American Red Cross Commission spent several days going about a farm region where normal conditions prevailed, visiting numerous villages and observing the life of the people intimately. This tour was taken as a means of obtaining a mental measuring stick with which to compare normal living conditions with the famine conditions to be studied later. Had the members of the Commission not known already that they were seeing normal life, they might readily have believed that they were in a land of semi-famine. The month was June but the fields were bare. Streams were dry. Few persons were in the fields. Most of the people were in the villages sitting on their doorsteps or gathered listlessly in idle

groups on the streets. The rain gods had been brought from the temples and set out in the blazing sun. The dry season had been unusually prolonged and there was little to do until the rains began. Meantime the people were living on such meager stocks of food as they had been able to stretch out over the months since the harvest of last fall, or to find in the leaves of trees, roots of certain herbs, etc. The fact that the population had not deserted the villages to go elsewhere in search of food, and the still more significant fact that few children had the swollen abdomens characteristic of starvation, were proof that hunger in severe form was absent. The farmer rarely or never tastes meat.

These studies of living standards to which reference has just been made contain significant facts concerning earnings in the regions remote from populous centers. From one such study (Boris P. Torgasheff, sometime lecturer of the Peiping National University), the following is quoted:

"As regards the interior of the country, we may see there far lower standards of living. It is a fact, for instance, established by a number of quite recent investigations, that, in many regions, Chinese farmers and hired farm hands (both these categories are fed similarly) spend for food about \$25.00 (equivalent to \$12.50 American money) a year for the needs of a family of five persons, counting not only cash outlay but the cost of food produced on the farm as well."

From the same study is quoted the following:

"Thus with respect to clothing we may conclude here that the largest part of China's population, which is the peasantry, spends on clothing approximately two silver dollars (\$1.00 gold) a year."

Edward Thomas Williams, for many years a resident of China and a sympathetic student of her people is the author of an important work entitled, *China Yesterday and Today*, published by Thomas Crowell, New York. From this book is quoted:

"A careful and experienced observer estimates that three millions of people die annually in China for lack of proper sustenance."

APPENDIX VII

Transportation

The success of any major relief operation relates itself very closely to the degree of speed and efficiency that can be developed in the transportation and delivery into the affected areas of the necessary relief supplies.

Some idea of the problem which this presents today in China can be gained from the following comparative figures:

	China	United States
Area (sq. miles)	4,278,000	3,743,000
Population	425,000,000	120,000,000
Railway mileage	7,000	250,000
Surfaced roads, mileage	5,000	600,000
Percentage of people in farming population	80	35

Transportation Facilities

Railroads. Of the 18 provinces of China proper five are entirely without rail transportation and many are served only to a very limited extent by railroads. None of the existing lines extend as much as 500 miles inland, being confined largely to the provinces along the eastern coast. Szechuan, the Texas of China, with an estimated population of 50,000,000, has not as yet a single mile of railroad, and the same is true of the provinces of Shensi, Kansu, Kweichow and Kwangsi.

Waterways. The benefits and economics of water transportation were early appreciated in China as is evidenced by the many canals built in the maritime provinces. On the other hand few of the rivers are navigable except for small cargo boats, that are towed or poled, and steamboats are in use on few streams excepting the Yangtsze and West rivers. Although the improvement and further development of waterways is a field in which much can be accomplished, water transportation facilities are not now avail-

able to any great extent in those provinces most seriously affected at present by a shortage of food supplies.

Inland Transportation Facilities. Transportation beyond the railhead in some districts is by ox or mule cart, in others by pack train or human carrier, in but few instances is it possible to use motor trucks and then only over very limited areas. By far the greatest quantity of freight is moved by human labor over roads that even at their best are indescribably bad. It is difficult except by personal observation for anyone to get a picture of the tremendous amount of human energy expended in China in doing work that could be more efficiently done through mechanical rather than human effort, and only in a country in which a labor surplus existed would it be possible for such inefficient methods to survive.

With such limited transportation facilities, the distribution of relief supplies would prove difficult even though a high degree of efficiency prevailed in the operation of the railway systems. Unfortunately, the railroads of the country are in a most deplorable condition, and as a result it is not possible to make freight shipments with any degree of security and despatch.

General Chu Ching-lan, a retired general, has acted as a volunteer agent for purchasing and transporting grain for relief agencies, and as he has not been involved in recent political or military activities, he has been able to command the support and confidence of all groups. Because of this fact, General Chu has been able to secure for the transportation of relief supplies enough railway equipment for the operation of several trains. The grain purchased in different parts of Manchuria is assembled at Mukden and then forwarded to Feng Tai, the junction point of the Peiping-Mukden, Peiping-Suiyuan, and Peiping-Hankow lines, where it is turned over to the relief committees operating in the different provinces. The movement of grain from Mukden to Feng Tai is a personally conducted affair. General Chu, or his personal representatives, have accompanied the train, sleeping and eating with the train crew and a small military guard. Upon discharging at Feng Tai, the empty trains

are taken back to Mukden to repeat the process. This rather remarkable situation can hardly be understood without some knowledge of the conditions which have grown up in China during the past several years.

Military Leaders Hoard Rolling Stock

Intense rivalry, suspicion, and in many instances, hostility, has existed among the Chinese military leaders. Each controls one or more provinces from which he draws his army and his revenues, and which is his own particular possession and stronghold. He will tolerate no interference or meddling by other leaders. Into his own territory, he draws all the apparatus of offense and defense which he can collect, including food reserves for his armies, railroad engines and cars, carts, draught animals, etc.

When Marshal Chang Tso-lin, the former war lord of Manchuria, acknowledged the dominance of the Nationalist forces, withdrew his army from Peiping, and returned with all his forces and spoil to Manchuria, he managed to draw into his undisputed domain a very large proportion of all the rolling stock of all the railroads of northern China. The railroad yards of Manchuria became jammed with hundreds of engines and thousands of cars, which were the property of railroads on which China depended for a very large proportion of her movement of commerce.

Other war lords seeing this took a hand in the game and seized and segregated such railroad equipment as they could obtain for the use of their own armies. But Chang Tso-lin captured the lion's share of the spoil. His purpose was two-fold: first, he thought he might need all this equipment for the future movements of his armies; second, he did not want his rivals to have the benefit of it.

Accordingly, the major railway systems of China were virtually stripped bare of their engines and cars by the greedy military leaders, with the greater part of the plunder in Manchuria. Marshal Chang Tso-lin was assassinated just as he arrived in Mukden, but his son and successor, Chang Hsueh-liang, continued his father's policy, and has rigidly refused to allow his collection of railroad equipment to leave his jurisdiction and to be put back into

the service of the railroads of the country which are hopelessly crippled for lack of it.

Difficulty of Moving Relief Grain

While a number of different relief agencies have bought grain in the Manchurian market, none of them have been able to arrange for its transportation except through General Chu, as apparently no one else has been able to satisfy the officials in control of the railway equipment as to his ability to guarantee its return.

Some idea as to the hopelessness of meeting a really big relief problem while laboring under a transportation handicap of this character can be had from a report published in the February Monthly Bulletin of the China International Famine Relief Commission respecting the relief grain then available as well as an estimate of the time required to effect its delivery at Feng Tai.

"1928-29 Manchurian Relief Grain in sight:

"Four Province Committee 20,000 piculs or	5,000 tons
"North East Relief Committee.....	10,000 "
"Wu Tai Shan Buddhist Association some money, amount uncertain, say.....	200 "
"Chi Sen Hui buying through General Chu \$80,000	1,100 "
"C. I. F. R. C. \$120,000.....	2,000 "
"Chang Hsueh Liang Gift, say.....	400 "
	<hr/>
	18,700 "

"At 600 tons each train, this takes 35 trains. General Chu has taken in the eighth train on February 4. Available grain will keep him busy for 27 trains or at least three months."

Even with the delivery of the grain at Feng Tai, the transportation problem is far from solved for when the Commission passed through this station on August 15 there were stacked in the railroad yards, awaiting shipment to points on the Peiping-Hankow and Peiping-Suiyuan lines, hundreds of tons of grain only partially protected from the weather and beginning to mould and rot as a result of heavy rains.

A further understanding of the present condition of China's railroads can be had from a statement issued on August 22 by Mr. Sun Fo, Minister of Railways. This statement was in part as follows:

" . . . On account of interferences by military authorities, it has been most difficult to reorganize the various railways of the country. Four months ago, the railways in the north were paying more than \$2,000,000 monthly to various local military groups. The Peiping-Hankow line was paying the Second Group Army Corps every month \$500,000, and the Third Army Corps \$350,000, although the total monthly income of the line was only about \$2,000,000. The average monthly income of the Peiping-Suiyuan railway was about \$300,000 and it had to pay \$200,000 a month to the Third Group Army Corps. The southern section of the Peiping-Mukden Railway formerly had to pay the Fourth Group Army Corps and later General Tang Seng-chi's troops \$300,000 monthly. The Lunghai railway pays \$400,000 monthly to the Second Group Army Corps.

"A proposal was introduced at the recent Disbandment Conference asking that such practice should be immediately abolished. Starting from this month, the southern section of the Peiping-Mukden line, and the Lunghai line will stop paying the local military authorities. The Peiping-Hankow line is not paying the Second Group Army Corps, but is paying the Third Group Army Corps as usual. The Third Group Army Corps is still receiving money from the Peiping-Suiyuan line. An effort will be made to put an early end to such illegal practices.

"The average income of the Peiping-Suiyuan railway used to run up to \$800,000, but in recent years it has dwindled to \$300,000. The chief cause is that, owing to its heavy subsidies to military authorities, it had to raise its freight rates. The duties are so high that merchants have stopped shipping their goods on the line. Formerly, the fur merchants at Kalgan shipped their goods to Tientsin and Peiping to be exported to foreign countries. Now the excessive duties have killed their trade and the foreign merchants are going to Russia to buy furs."

Commenting on Mr. Sun Fo's statement the *Shanghai Times* on August 24 carried the following most interesting editorial:

"Hands Off the Railways

"Realization of the problems one has to meet is one of the primary steps towards effecting reform where chaos reigns. Mr. Sun Fo, Minister of Railways, appears to suffer from no delusions in regard to the causes of the present plight of China's railways, and, what is more, he is not afraid publicly to express his views. Without doubt, Mr. Sun Fo is sincere in his desire to save China's railways from complete disruption. Every reader is aware of the manner in which the military leaders in China have used the railways, and of the entire disregard for the rolling stock. Animals have been carried in first-class coaches so near Shanghai as the Shanghai-Nanking line, while soldiers have often behaved worse than any animal. On some lines the troops broke up the carriages for firewood; locomotives have been operated by inexperienced men; there has been little attempt anywhere except on lines where foreigners have been allowed a certain say to overhaul and repair rolling-stock. Further, war-lords have carried off locomotives and coaches and held them for their own purposes in areas over which they held sway, until when a great famine descended on the northwest and central provinces relief workers found possibly their most difficult problem that of obtaining adequate transport facilities on the railways. From the outset of his career as Minister of Railways Mr. Sun Fo realized that a great problem awaited solution, and it is significant that the National Government has been compelled to persuade, rather than order, the various war-lords to return the rolling-stock that belongs to the Government of the country. Mr. Sun's recent visit to Mukden has the significance that today Nanking cannot command obedience, but must resort to negotiation. . . .

"The Minister of Railways also gives an instance where a railway actually increased its freight rates in order to satisfy the demands of the military. He says that the duties on the Peiping-Suiyuan railway are now so high that merchants have stopped transporting their goods by that line. Mr. Sun adds, 'Formerly the fur merchants at Kalgan shipped their goods to Tientsin and Peiping to be exported to foreign countries. Now the excessive duties have killed their trade and the foreign merchants are going to Russia to buy furs.'

"This statement should be broadcast throughout China, and its moral pointed out to those who have no experience of trade relations and their economic bearing. Although China's railways only total seven thousand

miles, their debts amount to about \$650,000,000, which sum covers almost one-third of China's debts. If the military keep their hands off railway revenues and are forced to cease preventing the lines earning money, this debt, though a great millstone, need not cause the Minister of Railways to despair. Mr. Sun is fortunate in being able to draw on Boxer Indemnity funds for new construction, so that extension of rail communications will not be held up during the period required to bring the present lines out of the chaos into which the majority have fallen. It seems to us that everything depends on the disbandment of China's huge armies. Even if the army leaders refrain from taking railway funds, their men have to be paid, and we all know how adept is the Chinese soldier in taking from the people direct what he otherwise cannot get."

Some of the difficulties of inland transportation can be illustrated by quoting from a report of a relief worker engaged in the task of getting supplies from the railroad to Yulin in Northern Shensi:

**"Difficulty and Expense of Transporting Grain from
Distant Regions**

"The two possible rail heads for delivery of such grain would be Pao-tow and Yu-tze. You are better informed than I of the difficulties by rail to these points. As to the Pao-tow route, you found the problem of forwarding from there last spring almost insurmountable. As to the Yu-tze route, it would present immense problems. I have enumerated a few.

"A. There is no cooperative altruism among those who would be engaged in carrying. If teamsters and muleteers are dealt with direct, or if through inns or other agencies, if delivery of absolutely full weight is required at destination these people become disgruntled and want to quit. They have a hundred excuses for shortage other than admission of theft. On the other hand if any laxity is shown as regards amount delivered, the cheating will mount and mount. Any rigid arrangements as to time limits for delivery are also exceedingly difficult to enforce.

"To have all grain accompanied on road and trail by sufficient men to guard against theft would mean an unbearable expense even if otherwise practicable. And I know of no way of recruiting such a body of men who would be more than a small per cent more trustworthy than the teamsters themselves.

"B. Only large lots of grain would afford really appreciable relief for this region. And the transportation of large lots would disturb the balance of inward and outward bound freight so as to make costs mount much higher than ordinary freight costs. What I mean is this. Normally the outgoing products from North Shensi, of hides, wool and hair, salt, soda, etc., balance in a general way the weight of goods coming in, so that animals and carts have loads for both directions and charge accordingly. A large movement of grain in would mean empty return trips for carriers, and so a doubling of the transportation charge.

"C. Figuring five days trail this side of the Yellow river to the average distribution point, with the present prevailing feed prices for animals, I estimate that an average cost per ton of transportation of grain from Yu-tze to destination of about \$120. This might mount next autumn and winter to \$175 or even \$200 if balance of movement of freight were disturbed as I have indicated above.

"D. I am not sure that facilities could be found for moving large allotments of grain, with the offer of any sort of terms."

APPENDIX VIII

China's National Government

In that the National Government of China today is completely controlled by a political party, which in turn is controlled by its leaders, with no form of democratic government, and no popular vote or election of officers, it has close resemblance to the Soviet Government of Russia, although repudiating communism as a guiding principle. Leaders of the Government and of the ruling Kuomintang Party assert that this form of government is purely provisional and is intended to exist only a few probationary years until the Chinese people are educated to the point at which they are prepared to participate intelligently in a more popular form of government.

Briefly, the scheme of the Chinese Nationalist Government is as follows:

The Government was established by the organic law for the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China, adopted by the Central Political Council and promulgated at Nanking, October 3, 1928, by the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang Party, which exercises all political power in the country. The Government was inaugurated on October 10, 1928. This Government will function during the present period of "political tutelage" of the Chinese people. By an interpretative resolution passed by the Central Executive Committee at the time of the promulgation of the organic law, the system of government thereby created was made subject to the control and supervision of the Kuomintang. The authoritative bodies in the Central Kuomintang Party organization are the Central Executive Committee, the Central Supervisory Committee, and the Central Political Council. There has been no meeting of the National Congress of the Kuomintang, from which these bodies derive their authority, since 1924.

The Nationalist Government of the Republic of China has its capital at Nanking.

The State Council is the highest unit under the system of government provided for by the organic law.

The Chairman of the State Council is General Chiang Kai-shek, who is designated as head of the Government for purposes of representation, with the duties of Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. The State Council, in addition to the Chairman, consists of sixteen members.

Dependent from the State Council are the five Yuan or branches of the Government. These are as follows:

The *Executive Yuan* with a Director, assisted in the executive work of the government by ten ministries, viz: Interior, Foreign Affairs, Military Administration, Finance, Agriculture and Mines, Labor and Commerce, Education, Railways, Communications, and Public Health.

The *Legislative Yuan* with a Director, assisted by boards on Codification, Foreign Relations, Finance, and Economics.

The *Judicial Yuan*.

The *Examination Yuan*.

The *Control Yuan*.

Each Yuan has a Director and a Deputy Director.

The *Kuomintang*, or People's Party program (Nationalist Government) supporting Dr. SunYat-sen's Three People's principles, Nationalism, Democracy, People's Livelihood in foreign policy, opposed to the present status of China's international relations, desires revision of so-called "unequal treaties". In domestic policy, it plans reconstruction of internal administration on the basis of a centralized national government with special powers to the provinces under the direction of the central government, and insists upon the control of all officers by members of the *Kuomintang*.

The *Communist Party* is affiliated with the third Internationale. In foreign policy, it favors an active alliance between China and Soviet Russia for the suppression of imperialism and capitalism, and in the interests of the world revolution. In domestic policy, it proposes a Soviet Government and a frankly communistic economic and social program.

The Actual Conditions

At the present time (August, 1929) the bond between the Central Government and a large majority of the provinces is purely nominal. Most of the provinces acknowl-

edge the supremacy of Nanking, but that is as far as they go. The provincial war lords, who hold the fate of the Nationalist Government in their hands, collect and extend their taxes without regard to the Central Government, and with three or four exceptions, the Central Government receives no financial support whatever from the provinces. Meantime, the Central Government enjoys the customs revenues collected at Tientsin, Shanghai, Nanking, and perhaps other ports, and this supplemented by sums received from the few loyal provinces gives the Central Government meager support.

In theory, the chief officer of a province is an appointee of Nanking. In practice, the general, who by military prowess has gained control of a province, usually sits tight in his independent position and is given the appointment by the National authority because that is the only possible method of giving the outward aspect of a unified China. Within his province the general is virtually an absolute monarch. He commands very large revenues obtained through taxes levied by himself. If he is a man of wisdom and honesty he promotes the welfare of his people, builds roads, promotes education and maintains law and order.

The outstanding example of this type of provincial chief is General Yen Hsi-shan, who for more than 20 years has been the governor of the province of Shansi where he is universally respected. Some of his methods, however, are peculiar from the western point of view. For example, the Peking and Suiyuan railroad crosses the northern point of Shansi, with important sections in other provinces. It belongs wholly to the National Chinese Government, and is operated by it. The road is in a lamentable physical and financial condition. It is incurring an immense monthly deficit. Its rolling stock and track are in almost unbelievably depleted and run down condition. The road a few years ago was cited as a fine instance by which to prove the ability of the Chinese to build and operate their own railroads. The civil war generals commandeered the engines and cars, and many of them were never returned; others came back in dilapidated plight. It is said there is no money to repair track and rolling stock, or to buy imper-

actively needed new equipment because General Yen Hsi-shan arbitrarily takes from the railroad's gross earnings the sum of \$200,000 per month with which to help maintain his Shansi army.

Provincial governors of another type take no interest in the welfare of their people, but levy crushing taxes and apply the revenues to maintaining their private armies, and to building up for themselves immense fortunes, while maintaining personal establishments on a scale of unrestrained extravagance. Between these extremes will be found many gradations of honesty and ability among the provincial governors, and this condition doubtless will obtain until the National Government succeeds in its effort to bring all the provinces under centralized control.

All who have given attention to the taxing practices of China see in their drastic and comprehensive reform one of the most humane and practicable means of lightening the wretched economic plight of the farmers. Arbitrary and confiscatory taxes are alleged to have been a powerful factor in bringing about the extreme destitution which has prevailed in many parts of the country, and has been largely contributory to the conditions of famine which have appeared in a number of widely separated areas. Extension of national authority to the control of the provinces is regarded as a first effective step to reform in methods of taxation.

The Nationalist Government has proclaimed that China is now unified; that the "revolution" is complete, and that the Central Government is solidly on its feet. It is true that some of the powerful military leaders have been overthrown and others have aligned themselves with the group led by General Chiang Kai-shek. Others for the present have withdrawn from militant activity, but only time can prove whether the much desired goal of unification has been achieved.

APPENDIX IX

Representative Men Whom the Commission Consulted

Representative men with whom the American Red Cross Commission to China consulted in connection with their investigation of famine conditions in China. The inclusion of a man's name in this list does not imply that he is in agreement with this report or its conclusions. As a matter of fact, many gradations of opinion exist among the gentlemen with whom the Commission conferred. All those mentioned, however, have an intelligent knowledge of China and Chinese conditions and their knowledge and opinions proved of very great value in the collection of information by the Commission and in the preparation of its report.

Nanking

GENERAL CHIANG KAI-SHEK, *President, Central Executive Committee, Chinese Nationalist Government.*

HON. C. T. WANG, *Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

HON. MI CHOU, *Minister of the Interior.*

HON. Y. L. TONG, *Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

MR. CHIN-AN PAO, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*

MR. D. P. AN, *Ministry of the Interior.*

HON. WALTER A. ADAMS, *American Consul.*

Representatives of the National Famine Relief Commission and of the relief committees of the provinces of Honan, Shansi, Shensi, and Kansu.

Peiping

ABEND, HALLET, *New York Times.*

ARNOLD, JULEAN, *American Commercial Attache—over 20 years in China.*

BAKER, JOHN EARL, *Executive Secretary, American Advisory Committee.*

BENNETT, CHAS. R., *National City Bank of N. Y., Manager.*

CALDER, A. BLAND, *Assistant Commercial Attache.*

CHEN, GEN. SHANG, *Governor of the Province of Hopei.*

CHEN, W. W., *President of the Chinese Red Cross.*

- CLARK, GROVER C., *Associated Executive Secretary of the C. I. F. R. C.*
- CHU CHING-LAN, GEN., *In charge of shipment of relief grain from Manchuria.*
- DJANG, D. Y., *Executive Secretary, C. I. F. R. C.*
- EDWARDS, DWIGHT, *C. I. F. R. C. and Y. M. C. A.*
- FERGUSON, DR. JOHN C., *Writer and former Adviser Chinese Government.*
- GILLIS, MR., *Banker.*
- GREENE, ROGER, *Director Rockefeller Foundation in China.*
- HARTIGAN, M. H., *Manager, British American Tobacco Co.*
- HOWE, JAMES P., *Associated Press.*
- HU, LIVINGSTON, *Ministry of Railways.*
- LI, CHU-YUAN, *Shansi Famine Relief Committee.*
- LIANG, M. T., *President C. I. F. R. C.*
- MACMURRAY, J. V. A., *American Minister to China.*
- McKENZIE, WILLIAM, *In charge Salvation Army.*
- PEABODY, STEPHEN, *Missionary representative of C.I.F.R.C.*
- POLAND, MR., *Adviser Chinese Government.*
- TODD, O. J., *Engineer for C. I. F. R. C.*
- TONG, Y. T., *Engineer, Peiping-Suiyuan R. R. representing Mr. Liu.*
- TSUR, Y. T., *C. I. F. R. C. and with educational interests.*
- WEI, DR. W. P., *Prominent Chinese official and citizen.*
- YEW, IRVING C., *Engineer, Peiping-Suiyuan R. R. representing Mr. Liu.*
- Representatives of the Honan Famine Relief Committee.*

Shanghai

- ARTHUR, MR. C. B., *Manager, Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.*
- BASSETT, MAJOR A., *British American Tobacco Co.*
- BEI, MR., *Banker.*
- BOYTON, DR.
- BRITTON, MR.
- COKELY, MR.
- COUSINS, MR. L. G., *Acting Director, British American Tobacco Co.*
- CORBETT, MR.
- CUNNINGHAM, HON. E. S., *American Consul General.*
- DAVIS, DR.

- DYER, MR.
FRANKLIN, MR.
FRENCH, MR.
GALE, MR.
HAGER, MR.
HANSON, MR.
HENCKENDORFF, MR. A. T.
HOLCOMB, MAJOR.
I-DING, MR. WONG, *Chairman General Council, Chinese Red Cross.*
KEPLER, DR.
LIANG, MR. SOONG TSZE, *Commissioner of Foreign Affairs.*
LYMAN, MR.
MASON, MR., *Chinese Foreign Famine Relief Committee.*
MARX, MR.
MCCRACKEN, DR., *Supt., St. Luke's Hospital.*
PHILLEO, MR.
RAWLINSON, DR.
SHIH, DR. HU, *Writer and Educator.*
SMITH, MR. MAXCY.
SOKOLSKY, MR., *Writer, newspaper correspondent.*
STOCKER, MR. E. C., *Whangpoon Conservancy Board.*
WALKER, MR.
WOLSIFFER, MR. C. F., *British American Tobacco Co.*
WONG, DR. B. Y., *Director General, Chinese Red Cross.*
YING, MR. HSU SHIH, *Chairman, National Famine Relief Commission.*
The Chairman of Shanghai Municipal Government.
The Solicitor, Shanghai Municipal Government.

APPENDIX X

List of Provinces of Individuals and Committees Consulted

Honan Province

Chengchow

W. W. LAWTON, *American Baptist Mission.*

EDWIN P. ASHCROFT, *American Free Methodist Mission.*

MR. LIU, *Chairman, Honan Provincial Famine Relief Committee.*

MR. WEI, *Honan Provincial Famine Relief Committee.*

MR. LI KOU-TING, *Honan Provincial Famine Relief Committee.*

MR. LI I-NAN, *Honan Provincial Famine Relief Committee.*

(*The above Committee also known as the Honan Committee for Transportation of Famine Sufferers.*)

Loyang

GENERAL HSUEH CHIA PUI, *Military Commander.*

Shensi Province

Sianfu

K'ANG CHI-YAO, *Chairman, China International Famine Relief Committee.*

J. WATSON, *Vice-chairman, China International Famine Relief Committee.*

PEI SHAO-YU, *Treasurer, China International Famine Relief Committee.*

FATHER ORMAZABAL, *China International Famine Relief Committee.*

HO CHING-HSIEN, *China International Famine Relief Committee.*

F. S. RUSSELL, *China International Famine Relief Committee.*

C. J. ANDERSON, *China International Famine Relief Committee.*

DR. H. G. STACKLEY, *English Baptist Hospital.*

TANG CHI-YAO, *Civil Governor.*

Fengsiang

English Baptist Mission.

REV. AND MRS. C. H. STEVENS.

BRIGADIER GENERAL CHAO, *Military Commander.*

MAGISTRATE SHI.

Sanyuan

China International Famine Relief Committee.

PASTOR SUN CHUN, *Chinese Pastor English Baptist Mission*; REV. HSIEH, REV. KAO, MR. CHU, MR. CH'ENG, MR. WU, MR. CHANG, MR. LU, MR. CH'EN, MR. SUN, MR. W. MUDD, MR. G. A. YOUNG, MISS CURTIS of *English Baptist Mission*, KAO YIN TSENG, *Civil Governor.*

Shansi Province

Taiyuanfu

N. E. ELLSWORTH, *Chairman, China International Famine Relief Commission.*

WONG LU HSUN, *Member of the Committee.*

China International Famine Relief Commission.

MARSHAL YEN HSI-SHAN, *Governor.*

GENERAL YANG CHAO TAI, *China Famine Relief Committee, Provincial Government.*

MR. WONG LU HSUN, *Director of Construction.*

MR. CHIN YANG CHUN, *Minister of Interior.*

MR. K'ENG PU CHAN, *Minister of Mines and Agriculture.*

MR. WANG CHAO TAI, *Pres. Chamber of Commerce.*

LIANG CHEN CHU, *Magistrate.*

LIU KWAN WU.

Suiyuan Province

Kweihwating or Suiyuanfu

China International Famine Relief Commission.

REV. PERE A. VERSTRATEN of *Belgian Catholic Mission.*

REV. PERE J. VAN OOST of *Belgian Catholic Mission.*

REV. PERE C. CRABBE of *Belgian Catholic Mission.*

MR. W. DREIER, *China Inland Mission.*

MISS A. NICOLAUSSEN, *China Inland Mission.*

MISS E. SVENSSON, *China Inland Mission.*

- MR. J. H. SODERBOM, *Commercial.*
MR. G. E. SODERBOM, *Commercial.*
MR. FENG HSI of *Provincial Government.*
MR. WANG TA-HSUEN, *Feng Yeh Bank.*
MR. CHOW SUNG YAO, *Provincial Government.*
MR. TUAN LI CHUANG, *Chairman Chamber of Commerce.*
MR. CHANG CHIN, *Board of Education.*
MR. KUO HSIANG CHI, *Chen Wu Huei.*
MR. PA CHAO WRUEI, *Chief of Police.*
MR. YEN HSIAO, *Board of Education.*

Saratsi

- China International Famine Relief Commission.*
MR. DWIGHT EDWARDS.
MR. O. J. TODD.
MR. Y. Y. TSU.
T. OBERG, *Swedish Mission.*
The Magistrate of Saratsi.

Paotow

- SCOTT, *Secretary, Paotow I. F. R. Committee, Church of England Missionary.*
The Magistrate of Paotow.